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SARAH E. LIGHT* 
Abstract: Two competing theories vie for dominance regarding the relation-
ship between the U.S. military and the natural environment. On the one hand, 
because legal rules permit the military to disregard environmental laws when 
they conflict with the military’s national security mission, one might be left 
with the impression that the military always stands opposed to environmental 
protection. Yet the military is currently engaged in an extensive undertaking to 
improve its sustainable energy use by reducing demand and developing re-
newables in its multiple roles as a war fighter, a landlord, a first user of pre-
commercial technologies, and a potential high-demand consumer. The mili-
tary is undertaking such actions not only in response to congressional direc-
tives and presidential executive orders, but also voluntarily in response to its 
internal battlefield and national security needs. In some cases, the military is 
leveraging private financing rather than taxpayer funds to drive innovation. 
Such public-private partnerships among the military, private financiers, and 
technology firms are an essential form of collaboration with the potential to 
transform for the better not only our nation’s energy profile, but also the mili-
tary-industrial complex. At the same time, however, these relationships war-
rant some caution to prevent rent-seeking. This collaboration represents a new 
Military-Environmental Complex. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 17, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his 
farewell address to the nation.1 That speech is famous for the President’s 
caution: 
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 1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People (Jan. 
17, 1961), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOW-
ER 1960–61, at 1035 (1961). 
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In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisi-
tion of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the 
military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise 
of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the 
weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic 
processes. We should take nothing for granted.2 
President Eisenhower’s counsel was as prescient as it was wise. The mili-
tary-industrial complex of which he spoke has deep historical roots3 and 
largely pejorative connotations.4 Cooperation among the military, the pri-
vate sector, and universities, with the blessings of government institutions 
like Congress and the President, led to concerns about the entanglement of a 
private profit motive with the government’s strategic decision making about 
whether to go to war.5 
The military and its mission to “provide the military forces needed to 
deter war and protect the security of our country”6 are often perceived to be 
entangled with the military-environmental complex, and thus, inherently at 
odds with environmental protection.7 Legal doctrine reinforces this view. 
The military is largely exempt from environmental laws and regulations 
covering such broad areas as habitat conservation and information disclo-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Id. at 1038; see JAMES LEDBETTER, UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 6 (2011) (defining the military-industrial complex as 
“a network of public and private forces that combine a profit motive with the planning and imple-
mentation of strategic policy”). The term military-industrial complex is generally understood to 
include the web of interaction among the executive and legislative branches, and the private sec-
tor. LEDBETTER, supra (describing “Defense Department contracts and appointments of military 
contractors to government positions” as well as “lobbying by military contractors, campaign con-
tributions, and the desire of members of Congress to protect and expand military spending that 
benefits their districts” as part of the military-industrial complex). 
 3 See generally PAUL A.C. KOISTINEN, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1980) (describing the historical roots of the military’s relationship with private 
industry); WAR, BUSINESS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILI-
TARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (Benjamin Franklin Cooling ed., 1977) [hereinafter WAR, BUSINESS, 
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY] (describing military-industrial cooperation in armaments and naval 
shipbuilding going back to the War of 1812). 
 4 See LEDBETTER, supra note 2, at 6–12 (describing criticisms of the military-industrial com-
plex including that it “creates wasteful military spending”; “takes away from spending on social 
needs”; “distorts the American economy”; “has institutionalized an outsized role for the military in 
American society, even during peacetime”; “creates and extends a culture of secrecy”; and “leads 
to the suppression of individual liberty”). 
 5 See H.C. ENGELBRECHT & F.C. HANIGHEN, MERCHANTS OF DEATH: A STUDY OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMAMENT INDUSTRY 140–54, 173–89 (1934) (describing the role of private ar-
mament suppliers and banks in driving the United States to war); cf. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE 
POWER ELITE 198–224 (1956) (describing military officers as part of the social elite with access to 
power and influence). 
 6  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGIC SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE PLAN: FY 2010, at i 
(2010) [hereinafter SSPP FY 2010]. 
 7 See infra notes 37–51 and accompanying text. 
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sure rules concerning toxic chemicals—at least when those laws conflict 
with the military’s mission to protect national security.8 
In the arena of energy use—with its concomitant impact on climate 
change—the military hardly appears to be the environment’s friend. The 
military has an enormous carbon footprint and vast energy needs.9 The De-
partment of Defense (DoD) is the largest single consumer of energy in the 
nation.10 Although some might view this fact as yet more evidence of the 
military’s ongoing conflict with the environment, it should more properly 
be viewed as an exceptional opportunity for innovation in energy efficiency 
and the development of new technologies—both of which could have the 
potential for widespread crossover to and from the civilian realm. 
Although the military-industrial complex has largely pejorative conno-
tations, scholars have recognized a more positive dimension to the coopera-
tion it engendered between the military and the private sector.11 At its height 
during the twentieth century, the military-industrial complex led to the de-
velopment of new technologies such as semiconductors, the global position-
ing system (GPS), the internet, and computers, inventions that transformed 
both war fighting and the civilian realm.12 In addition to these “spin-offs” 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012) (waiving provisions governing control of toxic substanc-
es upon “a request and determination by the President that the requested waiver is necessary in the 
interest of national defense”); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2012) (exempting agency actions from provi-
sions protecting endangered species “if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is 
necessary for reasons of national security”). 
 9 See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text; see also Siddhartha M. Velandy, The Green 
Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on Climate Change, Energy Policy, and National Securi-
ty, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 309, 310–11 (2012). 
 10 ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST., FACT SHEET: DOD’S ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWA-
BLE ENERGY INITIATIVES 1 (2011), available at http://files.eesi.org/dod_eere_factsheet_072711.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6U7Z-HUCY. In fiscal year 2012, federal agencies emitted ap-
proximately 107 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent, including emissions that both were and 
were not subject to reduction targets; the DoD emitted 72% of that total, or approximately 77 
million metric tons of CO2-equivalent. See FY 2012 Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Government To-
tals 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (June 14, 2013), http://energy.gov/eere/femp/downloads/fy-
2012-greenhouse-gas-inventory-government-totals-2012, archived at http://perma.cc/T72J-BSBU. In 
fiscal year 2011, the DoD was responsible for approximately 83 million metric tons, or 72% of all 
federal agency emissions of approximately 115 million metric tons. See FY 2011 Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory: Government Totals 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (June 14, 2013), http://energy.
gov/eere/femp/downloads/fy-2011-greenhouse-gas-inventory-government-totals-2011, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q367-39W6. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2011, the 
last year for which data is available, the United States as a whole was responsible for emissions of 
5,409.631 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent. See International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3D37-VCFG (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (country data). For 2011, then, 
federal agencies were responsible for approximately 2% of overall U.S. emissions, and the DoD 
was responsible for approximately 1.5% of overall U.S. emissions. 
 11 See infra notes 74–122 and accompanying text. 
 12 See, e.g., PAUL N. EDWARDS, THE CLOSED WORLD: COMPUTERS AND THE POLITICS OF 
DISCOURSE IN COLD WAR AMERICA 43–74 (1996); David C. Mowery, Federal Policy and the 
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from the military into the private sector, military procurement of commer-
cially developed technologies stimulated industrial development by “spin-
ons” from the private sector to the military.13 Like this history of technolog-
ical innovation, the military’s current relationship to the environment and its 
interaction with the private sector—particularly in the areas of sustainable 
energy use, demand reduction, and pursuit of renewable energy sources—
are far more complex than legal exemptions or statistics about the DoD’s 
greenhouse gas emissions might lead one to believe. A more nuanced un-
derstanding of the relationship between the military and the environment in 
this exceptional area of sustainable energy use and climate change is both 
warranted and timely. 
The debate over how to combat climate change—focusing, for in-
stance, on efforts to reduce energy demand and promote the development of 
renewable energy sources—provides an especially important context in 
which to assess what role the military can play in advancing solutions to a 
major environmental problem. The primary questions in this law and policy 
debate center on the types of regulatory tools that best address the problem 
and the level of government at which those tools are best employed.14 There 
is a growing consensus among scholars that a multi-faceted approach to 
climate change—including efforts to reduce energy demand and switch to 
renewable sources of energy that incorporate both public and private ac-
tion—is essential in light of the practical reality that a single, global regula-
                                                                                                                           
Development of Semiconductors, Computer Hardware, and Computer Software: A Policy Model 
for Climate Change R&D?, in ACCELERATION ENERGY INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM MULTIPLE 
SECTORS 163–66 (Rebecca M. Henderson & Richard G. Newell eds., 2011); LEDBETTER, supra 
note 2, at 12. See generally STUART W. LESLIE, THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN SCIENCE: THE 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-ACADEMIC COMPLEX AT MIT AND STANFORD (1993) (describing how 
military needs drove technological innovation in the fields of engineering and computing); JEN-
NIFER S. LIGHT, FROM WARFARE TO WELFARE: DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS AND URBAN PROB-
LEMS IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2003) (describing how twentieth-century city planners and manag-
ers implemented technologies originally developed for the Cold War); Velandy, supra note 9 (not-
ing the military’s role in technological innovation). 
 13 Jay Stowsky, From Spin-Off to Spin-On: Redefining the Military’s Role in American Tech-
nology Development, in THE HIGHEST STAKES: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEXT SE-
CURITY SYSTEM 114–40 (Wayne Sandholtz et al. eds., 1992) (describing the successful diffusion 
of semiconductors from military origins, but noting the lack of similar success in the development 
of computer control technology for machine tools, and suggesting that other countries—including 
Japan—relied more effectively on the commercial sector to innovate efficiently and cost-
effectively in a form of “spin-on”); see The Military-Consumer Complex, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 
2009, at 16, 16; Tom A. Peter, Military Inventions Hit the Civilian Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR (June 19, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Tech-Culture/2008/0619/built-for-battle-
but-perfect-in-peacetime, archived at http://perma.cc/6K5E-GPXV. 
 14 Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 
797 (2005). 
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tory program is unlikely to materialize.15 This Article reinforces the notion 
that heterogeneity is essential, and that no single perfect solution to the cli-
mate change problem exists. 
In the vast legal literature addressing climate change, however, schol-
ars tend to view the government largely as a regulator16 or a source of fund-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
547 (2000) (noting that “nongovernmental actors, including corporations, public interest organiza-
tions, private standard setting bodies, professional associations, and nonprofit groups” play an 
essential role in governance when they “implement, monitor, and enforce compliance with regula-
tions”); Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in 
Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–6 (2014) (arguing that a second-best yet polit-
ically feasible policy or set of policies to combat climate change is preferable to waiting for an 
optimal policy solution); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, 
Insurance of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1795, 1795–1842 (2007) (addressing insurance’s role in driving individual behavior in the climate 
change context); Eric Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 197, 199, 205 & n.22 
(2011) (arguing that decentralized approaches, including “national and regional regulations, pub-
lic-private partnerships brokered by non-governmental organizations, various organizational alli-
ances, and everyday transactions for goods and services,” are “likely to provide effective and 
efficient responses to climate change in the long run” (citing R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The 
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); Lori Snyder Bennear & Robert 
Stavins, Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments, 37 ENVTL. RESOURCE 
ECON. 111 (2007))); Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We 
Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Action at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. 
THEORY 354, 354–56 (2012); S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate 
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968–72 (2004) (argu-
ing that multiple existing approaches should be employed to stabilize the atmospheric concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases below climate tipping points); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life 
of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2029, 2040–41 (2005) (arguing that “private actors play 
an increasing role in traditional government standard setting, implementation, and enforcement 
functions,” including by entering into private contractual agreements “in the shadow of public 
regulations . . . [that] may have far more[] influence on the accountability and efficacy of the regu-
latory state than do public/private hybrids”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: 
The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 914–15 (2007) 
(describing private contracting as environmental governance). 
 16 See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environ-
mental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 325–46 (1998) (proposing a framework for under-
standing how Congress chooses environmental policy instruments); Richard B. Stewart, A New 
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 22 n.1 (2001) (citing sources 
containing both defenses and criticisms of the current U.S. system of environmental regulation). 
Even advocates of market approaches see the essential role of government as regulator. See, e.g., 
David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design, in U.S. ENERGY TAX POLICY 113, 113–
58 (Gilbert E. Metcalf ed., 2011) (discussing the choice between government-created taxes and 
cap-and-trade systems as ways to reduce emissions); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, 
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334, 1341–51 (1985) (advocating gov-
ernment-sponsored market approaches to force firms to reduce emissions); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
& David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Re-
sponse to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6–9 (2009) (advocating 
a carbon tax to reduce emissions); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon 
Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 502 & n.11 (2009) (noting the advantages of a carbon tax over 
a cap-and-trade system); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
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ing to drive private innovation,17 rather than as a consumer of energy or a 
polluter.18 This perspective misses a crucial piece, not only of the underly-
ing story, but of a potential solution. 
The military has the potential to make an enormous impact on climate 
change policy, especially in its stimulation of strategies to reduce energy 
demand and encourage the development of renewables. Scholars and poli-
cymakers should think carefully about how to harness the exceptional 
alignment between the military’s mission and its need to reduce energy de-
mand and develop renewables, and more specifically, how cooperation be-
tween the military and the private sector could advance these ends. What 
this Article calls the “Military-Environmental Complex” has the potential to 
become one important tool in the regulatory toolkit to combat climate 
change. The Military-Environmental Complex also has the potential to 
transform some of the negatives of the historic military-industrial complex 
into positives for the environment and sustainability. 
The Military-Environmental Complex is the military’s extensive un-
dertaking to improve its sustainable energy use and reduce demand for fos-
                                                                                                                           
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) (advocating a cap-and-trade system to 
reduce emissions in the short to medium term). 
 17 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to 
Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (proposing government-
sponsored technology inducement prizes to “accelerate the rate of technological innovation in the 
energy sector”); Allison S. Clements & Douglass D. Sims, A Clean Energy Deployment Admin-
istration: The Right Policy for Emerging Renewable Technologies, 31 ENERGY L.J. 397, 398 
(2010) (favoring government financial support to “create a level playing field” for emerging clean 
technologies). Nevertheless, both Congress and the White House have imposed rules encouraging 
federal agencies to be leaders in efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy use. See 
infra notes 138–236 and accompanying text. 
 18 But environmental law and scholarship has not always focused primarily on private firms, 
rather than government agencies, as polluters. See Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information 
Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 572 (2013) (advocating 
information disclosure for federal agencies in the climate change context to reduce agency emis-
sions); Amy L. Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 683 
(2013) [hereinafter Stein, Agency Action] (arguing that federal agencies should be enlisted to sup-
port the shift to renewable energy); see also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: His-
torical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1158 (1995) (“To the extent that 
federal law was regulatory in character prior to 1970, the primary targets of environmental regula-
tion were federal agencies rather than private industry.”). One recent and notable exception to this 
focus on private actors has been in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”). See, e.g., Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Take Greenhouse Gases into 
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 49–55 (2009); Matthew P. 
Reinhart, The National Environmental Policy Act: What Constitutes an Adequate Cumulative 
Environmental Impacts Analysis and Should It Require an Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions?, 17 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 145–47 (2010); Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under 
NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 531–32 
(2010) [hereinafter Stein, The National Environmental Policy Act]. 
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sil-fuel-derived energy—both on the battlefield and in its installations.19 
Under this view of the military, the DoD’s interests are intertwined with the 
interests of members of Congress, the President, and the private sector. The 
military’s motivations to pursue energy efficiency are complex and multi-
dimensional—though always in service of the DoD’s primary mission to 
protect national security rather than out of an abstract desire to protect the 
environment.20 Whether to maximize the DoD’s discretionary budget,21 de-
fend soldiers’ lives,22 protect national security in the face of new risks from 
climate change,23 or win a “Green Arms Race,”24 the military is driven by 
                                                                                                                           
 19 I note that the term the “Military-Environmental Complex” has appeared in a non-academic 
context, as the title of two separate blog posts reporting on the military’s desire to seek exemptions 
from mandates to clean up polluted sites, Julia Scott, The Military Environmental Complex, SA-
LON (May 13, 2005, 1:50 PM), http://www.salon.com/2005/05/13/dod_pollutes/, archived at http://
perma.cc/BR92-KN6R, and in reporting of discussions about whether to change a provision of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
Roger Sorkin, The Military Environmental Complex?, NORTHEAST SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASS’N 
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.nesea.org/uncategorized/the-military-environmental-complex/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/PS3Y-KKTZ. In this Article, however, I define the term in regard to the academ-
ic literature on the military-industrial complex and the legal institutions and values that shape the 
military’s relationship to the environment to drive technological innovation and reduce energy 
demand. Other scholars have noted the important role that the military can play in hybrid forms of 
governance. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267, 336 (1998) (highlighting how “the military-industrial com-
plex—symbol to many of government as an instrument of self-dealing, and to others of a suspect 
connection between official power and violence—may well have been a pioneer in the use of 
methods that we would associate with a new form of democracy” where “power is decentralized 
to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individu-
al circumstances, but in which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share 
their knowledge with others facing similar problems”). 
 20 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, at vi (2014) [hereinafter 
QDR 2014], available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4JV8-TKER; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW RE-
PORT, at iii, 84–88 (2010) [hereinafter QDR 2010], available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/
QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DLM6-474Z. 
 21 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–
42 (1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek to maximize their agency budgets). The “discretionary 
budget” is “the difference between the total budget and the minimum costs of producing the agen-
cy’s outputs.” See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (2005). 
 22 Colonel Peter Newell, Director of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, explained: “It’s not 
about reducing energy usage and the overall bills, but about saving lives.” Amy Westervelt, How the 
Military Uses Green Tech to Save Soldiers’ Lives, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/amywestervelt/2012/02/14/how-the-military-uses-green-tech-to-save-soldiers-lives/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/W9AS-X2X2. 
 23 See Stephen Dycus, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5031, 5037 
& n.33, 5038–39 (2009) (arguing that climate change is creating new conflicts over shipping 
routes through the Arctic, promoting the loss of island nations and coastal communities, and de-
pleting other resources (citing JOSHUA W. BUSBY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: 
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/14862/climate_change_
and_national_security.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H2A7-SXJ2; KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., 
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unique incentives that position it as a first mover in both the development 
and the pre-commercial adoption of new technologies.25 These incentives 
arise out of the military’s many roles as a war fighter, landlord, and land 
manager. In the military context, climate change is a “threat multiplier,” 
creating instability in light of changing environmental realities, and energy 
efficiency is a “force multiplier,” increasing the capacity of the military to 
achieve its mission.26 Because of this exceptional alignment between the 
military mission and the need to conserve energy, address climate change, 
and develop renewables, the Military-Environmental Complex has the po-
tential to stimulate the development of new technologies through genuine 
demand for innovation, provide large-scale commercial support for existing 
technologies, and drive behavioral changes.27 
The Military-Environmental Complex, however, is not without its chal-
lenges. It may be difficult to change long-held beliefs about energy use, in-
cluding the views of both those within the military and those to whom the 
military is accountable. And although the DoD is expending resources on this 
                                                                                                                           
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L SEC., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SHK9-
SAS2; CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), availa-
ble at https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20
of%20Climate%20Change%20-%20Print.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z86D-2V63; NAT’L INTEL-
LIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 53–57 (2008), available at http://
www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf, arch-
ived at http://perma.cc/894T-JBUV; Jürgen Scheffran, Climate Change and Security, BULL. OF THE 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May–June 2008, at 19; James Stuhltrager, Global Climate Change and Na-
tional Security, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 36 (2008))). See generally STEPHEN DYCUS, NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996) (exploring the relationship between national 
defense and environmental issues). 
 24 See Velandy, supra note 9, at 309. 
 25 See QDR 2010, supra note 20, at 88 (“DoD will conduct a coordinated energy assessment, 
prioritize critical assets, and promote investments in energy efficiency to ensure that critical instal-
lations are adequately prepared for prolonged outages caused by natural disasters, accidents, or 
attacks.”). 
 26 See QDR 2014, supra note 20, at 8 (describing the effects of climate change on resource scar-
city as “threat multipliers”); CNA CORP., supra note 23, at 1 (“Climate change can act as a threat 
multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and it presents significant 
national security challenges for the United States.” (emphasis added)); Memorandum of Understand-
ing Between the U.S. Dep’t of Energy and the U.S. Dep’t of Def. 1 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter DOE 
MOU], available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Enhance-Energy-Security-MOU.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9R2Z-KTPU (“Energy efficiency can serve as a force multiplier, increas-
ing the range and endurance of forces in the field while reducing the number of combat forces divert-
ed to protect energy supply lines, as well as reducing long-term energy costs” (emphasis added)). 
Thanks to Jody Freeman for raising this point. 
 27 The Military-Environmental Complex may not only lead to the creation of new technolo-
gies, but also may affect values, behavior, and attitudes in the climate change context. I explore 
these issues, which are beyond the scope of this Article, in Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Secu-
rity: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming July 2014). 
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project, energy efficiency remains a small part of the military’s overall budg-
et.28 There is also the concern that interest groups, private firms, or individual 
members of Congress could use the Military-Environmental Complex as an 
opportunity for rent-seeking.29 It is important to be cautious and consider 
carefully whether new safeguards are appropriate to guard against such risks 
in this context. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains that the traditional 
doctrinal story in administrative and environmental law, which suggests that 
the military’s mission is incompatible with environmental protection, is in-
complete at best and misleading at worst.30 In fact, the DoD’s exceptional 
energy use aligns its mission with the goal of sustainable energy use, creat-
ing an opportunity to harness the power of the DoD to stimulate innovation 
in the clean energy arena.31 Although some scholars argue that military pro-
curement and military support for research and development (“R&D”) are 
not the most efficient means to stimulate such new technological innova-
tion, these scholars fail to note the exceptional alignment between the mili-
tary’s mission and the need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, as well as the 
fact that the military is already undertaking and supporting crucial innova-
tion in the energy sector.32 
Part II examines the values that are driving the military to reduce its 
conventional energy use—even in military operations—and how those values 
                                                                                                                           
 28 For fiscal year 2013, in addition to any use of operation and maintenance or military construc-
tion (“MILCON”) funds to upgrade facilities, the Army budgeted $562.4 million for operational 
energy initiatives, the Navy (including the Marine Corps) budgeted $402.1 million, and the Air Force 
budgeted $573.5 million. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ENERGY INVESTMENTS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 7–9 (2012) [hereinafter ENERGY INVESTMENTS], available at http://
energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/Reports/20120815_FY13_OE_Budget_Cert_Report.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/W2PD-6ZZN. Approximately 90% of those funds were designated for 
demand reduction efforts. See id. In addition, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, and the Office of Secretary of Defense provided $102.2 million in funding 
for the 2013 fiscal year. Id. at 8. To put these numbers in perspective, however, the sum of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force budget for these initiatives—about $1.54 billion—signifies merely 0.25% of the 
$613.9 billion the DoD requested for its 2013 fiscal year budget. See ENERGY INVESTMENTS, supra; 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST 1-1 (2012), available at http://dcmo.
defense.gov/publications/documents/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/48WJ-FVMQ.  
 29 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 36, 62–63 (1965) (arguing that interest groups are more likely to form 
when small groups may benefit); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 333–34 (1973) 
(discussing the development of interest groups when there are concentrated benefits and distribut-
ed costs); Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theo-
ry, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 688 (1964) (book review) (exploring the power dynamics of political 
relationships); supra notes 3–5 (citing sources on this point). 
 30 See infra notes 37–137 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 51–73 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 74–137 and accompanying text. 
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interact with the governmental institutions shaping the Military-Environmen-
tal Complex.33 Part III then analyzes the key role that the private sector plays 
in the Military-Environmental Complex, arguing that the Military-Environ-
mental Complex both grows out of and depends upon the previous interrela-
tionships among the military, other government institutions, and the private 
sector.34 Finally, Part IV argues that the Military-Environmental Complex can 
substantially benefit the environment by stimulating investment in and de-
mand for renewable energy technology, and that it should become an im-
portant factor in the debate over regulatory instruments to combat climate 
change.35 Part IV also offers some recommendations for ensuring that the 
Military-Environmental Complex serves as a force for good, rather than an 
opportunity for rent-seeking.36 
I. MILITARY EXCEPTIONALISM 
Environmental law doctrine tells us that the military is exceptional; 
when needs of national security and preparation for war conflict with envi-
ronmental goals, environmental goals must bend. Indeed, many federal stat-
utes not only acknowledge but support the idea that the environment and na-
tional security are in conflict. In reality, that relationship is far more complex. 
Although the law suggests that the military may disregard environmental pri-
orities if they conflict with its national security mission, the military has polit-
ical and economic incentives that prompt it to do more than the law requires 
in the area of sustainable energy use. This alignment—informed by the les-
sons of the military-industrial complex—provides the military with the op-
portunity to make major advances in sustainable energy policy. 
A. Exceptional Exemptions 
Under virtually all federal environmental laws, the President may grant 
time-limited, renewable waivers from environmental obligations for specif-
ic agency activities if such waivers are “in the paramount interest of the 
United States” or in the interest of national security.37 In some cases, the 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See infra notes 138–236 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 237–353 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 354–382 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 383–385 and accompanying text. 
 37 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012); Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006 & Supp. 
V); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(h) (2006 & Supp. V); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2006 & Supp. V); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(j) 
(2006 & Supp. V). The executive orders extending reporting requirements under the Toxics Re-
lease Inventory (“TRI”) program of the Emergency Preparedness and Community Right-to-Know 
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agency head—for example, the Secretary of Defense—rather than the Pres-
ident, may make that determination without further executive review.38 In 
addition, in a time of national emergency or after a declaration of war, Con-
gress has provided a blanket exemption for military construction projects 
“not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of 
the armed forces.”39 
Administrative law likewise tells us that the military is exceptional, 
and plays by a different set of rules—at least when combat operations are 
concerned. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exempts from its defi-
nition of agency “military authority exercised in the field in time of war or 
in occupied territory,” and likewise exempts such authority from the APA’s 
provisions for judicial review.40 The rulemaking and adjudication provisions 
of the APA contain even broader exemptions for “a military or foreign af-
fairs function of the United States” and “the conduct of military or foreign 
affairs functions,” respectively, regardless of which agency exercises such 
                                                                                                                           
Act also included national security exemptions. See Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, 
and Transportation Management, Exec. Order No. 13,423, 3 C.F.R. 193 (2007) (revoking Exec. 
Order No. 13,148 (2000)); Greening the Government Through Leadership in Environmental Man-
agement, Exec. Order No. 13,148, 3 C.F.R. 241 (2001) (revoking Exec. Order No. 12,856 (1993)); 
Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements, Exec. 
Order No. 12,856, 3 C.F.R. 616 (1994); CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, IN-
STRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING EXEC. ORDER 13423, at 27 (2007); see also Federal Leadership 
in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. 248 
(2010) [hereinafter Executive Order on Sustainability] (extending TRI reporting requirements for 
federal agencies). For a detailed discussion of the waiver provisions in environmental laws, see 
Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 105, 110–20 (2007). 
 38 See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(j) (2012) (authorizing the Sec-
retary of the Interior to promulgate regulations exempting agencies from certain provisions “in the 
event of a major natural disaster or an imminent threat to the national security”); Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)(1) (permitting the Secretary of Defense’s own determination 
of what is “necessary for national defense”); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2012) 
(permitting the Secretary of Defense’s own determination of the national security interest); Bob 
Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 315, 116 
Stat. 2458, 2509–10 (2002) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations 
providing for a military exception to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act); Federal Agency Decision to 
Waive Responsibilities, 36 C.F.R. § 78.3(a) (2013) (permitting the agency head to reach his or her 
own determination of whether “there is an imminent threat . . . to the national security such that an 
emergency action is necessary to the preservation of human life or property” so as to exempt the 
agency from provisions of the National Preservation Act); Authorization of Take Incidental to 
Military Readiness Activities, 50 C.F.R. § 21.15 (2013) (providing for an exception to the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act for the taking of migratory birds incidental to military readiness activities). 
 39 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2012); see Babcock, supra note 37, at 116. 
 40 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 701(b)(1)(G) (2012). For an in-depth discussion of the history of 
this language and an argument that it applies beyond the battlefield, see generally Kathryn E. 
Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2010). 
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functions.41 Enacted after World War II, and reflecting a compromise be-
tween the desire to rein in agency discretion and the recognition that the 
military should be left to protect national security without the threat of con-
stant litigation, the APA expressly, if not unambiguously, sets the military 
apart. 42 
Moreover, although the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
contains no express statutory exemption for military actions, 43  NEPA’s 
regulations create an “emergency circumstances” exception.44 An executive 
order clarifies that extraterritorial environmental impacts of agency actions 
in the case of armed conflict need not be assessed.45 Additionally, because 
NEPA incorporates the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the APA’s ex-
ceptions for military authority apply to NEPA as well.46 
Finally, Executive Order 12,866 subjects certain major agency regula-
tions to White House review by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (“OIRA”) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).47 It 
likewise exempts “[r]egulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign 
affairs function of the United States, other than procurement regulations and 
regulations involving the import or export of non-defense articles and ser-
vices . . . .”48 
                                                                                                                           
 41 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4). 
 42 See Kovacs, supra note 40, at 696–705 (citing Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 
40–41 (1950)) (discussing the APA’s enactment); id. at 712–20 (discussing various interpretations 
of “time of war” and “in the field” and arguing that courts and commentators have read the lan-
guage too narrowly). 
 43 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006 & Supp. V); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 
555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the Navy is not exempt from NEPA). But see 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 140–41, 146 (1981) 
(holding that while the Navy was not exempt from NEPA, it was not required to prepare and re-
lease a “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement,” under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), regarding 
the operation of a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons). 
 44 Emergencies, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2013) (requiring federal agencies to consult with the 
White House Council on Environmental Quality when “emergency circumstances make it neces-
sary to take an action with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of 
these regulations”); see Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 18–19 (2008) (not-
ing that the Council on Environmental Quality had authorized the Navy to implement “alternative 
arrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of “emergency circumstances”). 
 45 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979). The DoD has issued NEPA regulations adopt-
ing this position. See Policy, 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(e) (2013). NEPA also permits the use of a classi-
fied appendix in which classified disclosures can be made for purposes of judicial review. Agency 
Procedures, 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (2013). 
 46 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 12–13, 18–19 (vacating an injunc-
tion that had prohibited the Navy’s use of sonar during training exercises off the coast of Califor-
nia—notwithstanding the effects of that sonar use on marine species—where the President, the 
White House Council on Environmental Quality, and the Secretary of the Navy had determined 
that exemptions or waivers from governing environmental rules were in the national interest). 
 47 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 58093 (1993). 
 48 Id. 
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Environmental organizations and scholars decry these exemptions as 
allowing vast environmental degradation under elusive standards.49 In con-
trast, some within the military have argued that environmental laws remain 
a major source of “encroachment” on military readiness and prerogatives, 
and that military exemptions should be drawn even more broadly.50 Regard-
less of precisely where the doctrinal line is drawn, this legal backdrop sets 
up a conflict between the preservation of the environment and the national 
security interest of the United States. Yet that conflict is not inexorable. De-
spite these exemptions, the DoD itself has demonstrated that national secu-
rity and the military’s mission are deeply intertwined with the need to re-
duce energy use and develop alternative and renewable fuel sources. 
B. Exceptional Mission Alignment 
Although the military’s mission may conflict with environmental goals 
in some arenas—such as habitat conservation or wildlife protection—the 
DoD’s exceptional energy use creates a unique synergy between the military 
mission and the need for energy sustainability. The DoD is the largest single 
consumer of energy in the nation.51 The military’s total energy costs in fis-
cal year 2012 were $20.4 billion, approximately $4 billion of which were 
facility energy costs and $16.4 billion of which were operational energy 
costs.52 The DoD is also the nation’s largest landlord;53 it manages more 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Babcock, supra note 37, at 131, 146 (describing the military’s efforts to obtain perma-
nent exemptions, rather than temporary waivers, and arguing that these exemptions are “trou-
bling”). But cf. DYCUS, supra note 23, at 8 (noting that the exemptions for national security are 
rarely invoked). 
 50 See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 37, at 126 n.106 (citing Encroachment: Hearings Before the 
H. Gov’t Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001); U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Environmental 
Law Division Notes: Pending Legislation Targets Military Environmental Compliance, ARMY 
LAW., Dec. 2001, at 29, 30 n.17; Letter from Ten Members of the House of Representatives to 
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def. (Oct. 5, 2001)); E.G. Willard (Col.), Tom Zimmerman (Lt. Col.), 
& Eric Bee (Lt. Col.), Environmental Law and National Security: Can Existing Exemptions in 
Environmental Laws Preserve DoD Training and Operational Prerogatives Without New Legisla-
tion?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 65, 65, 87–88 (2004) (arguing that environmental laws are a source of “en-
croachment” on military readiness, that “the bottom line is that we must be able to train the way 
we fight,” and that existing exemptions are insufficiently narrow). This conflict came to a head 
after September 11, 2001, when the military sought—and Congress granted—broader exemptions 
to certain environmental laws. See Babcock, supra note 37, at 125–36 (discussing changes to 
environmental laws, including the Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, and 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, after 9/11). 
 51 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (providing statistics on this point). 
 52 OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENV’T, DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 16 (2013), 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/energy/energymgmt_report/FY%202012%20AEMR.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8ERM-2RAP [hereinafter AEMR FY 2012]; cf. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER 
SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENV’T, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 14 (2012), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/
892 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:879 
than 500 installations in the United States and overseas, covering approxi-
mately 2.3 billion square feet of building space.54 This physical footprint is 
three times the size of Wal-Mart’s, and six times that of the General Ser-
vices Administration (“GSA”).55 The DoD manages approximately 28 mil-
lion acres of land in the United States.56 Each service within the military—
the Army, Navy, and Air Force—has a different energy-use profile and dif-
ferent energy needs. 57 For example, the Army’s permanent bases are its 
largest energy consumer, while the Air Force and Navy have higher energy 
use from transportation fuels and lower consumption for facilities.58 Thus, 
the military’s energy needs are not only deep but broad, covering facilities 
and operations as well as the transportation needs spanning both sectors. 
The military’s mission aligns with the goals of reducing energy de-
mand, increasing energy efficiency, and increasing renewables. The DoD’s 
                                                                                                                           
energy/library/FY.2011.AEMR.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/8HVW-9P3Q [hereinafter AEMR 
FY 2011]. Facility energy “includes energy needed to power fixed installations and non-tactical 
vehicles.” AEMR FY 2012, supra, at 15. Operational energy is “the energy required for training, 
moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations. The term 
includes energy used by tactical power systems and generators and weapons platforms.” 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2924(5) (2012). The Annual Energy Management Report for fiscal year 2012 notes that this 
facility energy use constitutes only “1 percent of the total U.S. commercial sector’s energy con-
sumption.” AEMR FY 2012, supra, at 15 (citing Energy Consumption by Sector and Source, United 
States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=EARLY2012
&subject=0-EARLY2012&table=2-EARLY2012&region=1-0&cases=full2011-d020911a,early2012-
d121011b (last visited Apr. 2, 2014)). Such “one percent” arguments, however, can obscure the 
significance of these emissions and the importance of reducing all sources of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere. Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1385, 1386–88, 1398–1402 (2011) (arguing that although climate change can only be 
solved through regulation of small contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions, biases lead 
individuals to discount or ignore small values); see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (arguing that individuals are not motivated to protect resources when 
their impact from resource use is small but personal gains are large). 
 53 See Fostering a Federal Community of Green Building Leaders, CLOSING THE CIRCLE NEWS, 
Spring 2008, at 2, 2, available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/ctcspr08.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B8YX-SYYM. 
 54 AEMR FY 2011, supra note 52, at 4. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Stein, Agency Action, supra note 18, at 708; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Interior and 
Defense Departments Join Forces to Promote Renewable Energy on Federal Lands (Aug. 6, 2012), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15498, archived at http://perma.
cc/CS7K-NBT8 (noting that approximately 13 million acres of the DoD’s 28 million acres of land 
contain significant wind, solar, or geothermal energy resources). 
 57 The U.S. Marine Corps is an operating unit within the U.S. Navy. See U.S. Navy Organiza-
tion—An Overview, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/organization/org-over.asp, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Z4CN-CMML (last updated Nov. 28, 2006). 
 58 PEW PROJECT ON NAT’L. SEC., ENERGY & CLIMATE, REENERGIZING AMERICA’S DEFENSE: 
HOW THE ARMED FORCES ARE STEPPING FORWARD TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMPROVE 
THE U.S. ENERGY POSTURE 12–17 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_warming/Pew_Reenergizing20Americas20Defense20Report.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5E4-C74M. 
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mission is “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and protect 
the security of our country.”59 Indeed, the primary value driving the DoD’s 
role of reducing energy consumption and developing renewables in the Mil-
itary-Environmental Complex is the military’s goal of enhancing its mission 
to provide trained and ready soldiers for combat and to promote national 
security.60 The military has recognized not only that dependence on fossil 
fuels on the battlefield increasingly fosters security threats—such as the 
cost in lives of protecting fuel convoys supporting combat missions—but 
also that climate change caused in part by fossil fuel consumption will lead 
to further geopolitical instability.61 As Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs Sharon Burke explained: 
The key end goal is the mission—you have to be able to explain 
that we won’t succeed in the mission if we don’t reduce demand. 
This is not about energy efficiency in the abstract. We are a place 
with a job to do. If you are a business, you are trying to sell a 
product or make a profit. Here, we have the mission. Our goal is 
to lower the threat by reducing demand. Lower cost is important, 
but it’s not enough.62 
From fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan, more 
than 3000 Army personnel and Army contractors were wounded or killed in 
action as a result of attacks on fuel and water resupply convoys.63 In 2010, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 SSPP FY 2010, supra note 6, at i. One commentator has been particularly optimistic about 
the military’s role in this regard, stating that: 
The progeny of the Green Arms Race, rather than a strategy of mutually assured de-
struction, will be a more efficient fighting forces [sic], a reduction [of] the world-
wide reliance on fossil fuels, new spinoff green energy technologies, and the crea-
tion of a new, more stable, world order—a mutually assured sustenance. The once 
disparate approaches to address climate change, energy dependence, and national 
security become one and the same: initiate and win the Green Arms Race. 
Velandy, supra note 9, at 311–12. 
 60 OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
(QDR) FACT SHEET 2 (2010) (“Years of war have demanded that America’s Armed Forces rapidly 
innovate and adapt[,] . . . [in part by d]eveloping enterprise-wide climate change and energy strat-
egies.”). In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress amended legis-
lation to require the DoD in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to “examine the capabilities of 
the armed forces to respond to the consequences of climate change . . . .” National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 951, 122 Stat. 3, 290–91 (2008); see 
QDR 2014, supra note 20, at 8, 25; OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QDR 101: 
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW 1 (2010). 
 61 See QDR 2010, supra note 20, at 84–87. 
 62 Interview with Sharon Burke, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs (May 22, 2013). 
 63 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ENERGY FOR THE WARFIGHTER: OPERATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 4–
5 (2011) [hereinafter ENERGY FOR THE WARFIGHTER] (citing ARMY ENVTL. POLICY INST., SUS-
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ground convoys were attacked 1100 times.64 These numbers may not even 
reflect all efforts to transfer fuel from forward operating bases to patrol ba-
ses.65 Although flying in fuel may reduce these casualties, it can increase 
costs by a factor of ten and uses a great deal more fuel in the process.66 In 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenges of securing fuel convoys thus 
made the need to reduce petroleum consumption paramount. 67  Energy 
costs—both economic and political—are high, and perhaps unlike for other 
agencies, the DoD’s costs can be measured not in dollars, but in lives. These 
battlefield needs are driving the military to use new or existing technologies 
and better informational analysis to address the underlying problem by re-
ducing demand and changing behavior.68 
The same mission objective drives the military to ensure that its instal-
lations and facilities are protected from disruptions to the electric grid, 
whether as a result of climate-change-related natural disasters or cyber-
attack.69 When training in domestic installations, soldiers must learn to re-
duce demand if they are to do so on the battlefield. In speaking about the 
Army’s Net Zero Energy Installation (“NZEI”) initiative—a joint initiative 
with the DoD and the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to make participating 
Army pilot installations net zero in water, energy, or waste70—Marc Kodack 
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustain-
ability said that “[u]nless the concepts of ‘sustainability’ or ‘Net Zero’ allow 
the Army to do its mission better, I don’t care. The question is how do I cre-
ate a narrative that allows me to do more—the Army to enhance its mis-
sion.”71 
                                                                                                                           
TAIN THE MISSION PROJECT: CASUALTY FACTORS FOR FUEL AND WATER RESUPPLY CONVOYS, 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT (2009)), available at http://energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/
Reports/20110614_Operational_Energy_Strategy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S3G7-E3J2. 
 64 Id. at 5 (citing Gen. Duncan McNabb, Commander, U.S. Transp. Command, Address at the 
Military Strategy Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Feb. 7, 2011)). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Greenery on the March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2009, at 3, 3–4 (noting that 40% of fuel used 
by the military in Iraq and Afghanistan was used to run electricity generators, and that the military 
is seeking to reduce energy consumption by adopting “smart grid” technology, using insulation on 
military tents to reduce HVAC demand, and converting trash into electricity through the Tactical 
Garbage to Energy Refinery). 
 68 See Amy Westervelt, Why the Military Hates Fossil Fuels, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2012, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/amywestervelt/2012/02/02/why-the-military-hates-fossil-fuels-and-you-
should-too-part-one-inefficiency/, archived at http://perma.cc/EM9P-ZLDD. 
 69 Interview with John Lushetsky, Former Exec. Dir., Army Energy Initiatives Task Force 
(May 14, 2013). 
 70 See AEMR FY 2012, supra note 52, at 50 (describing the NZEI). 
 71 Telephone Interview with Marc Kodack, Office of the Assistant Sec’y of the Army for 
Energy and Sustainability (Apr. 5, 2013); see Army Vision for Net Zero, ARMY ENERGY PRO-
GRAM, http://army-energy.hqda.pentagon.mil/netzero/, archived at http://perma.cc/97P5-NMGH 
(last updated Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the Army’s goals for net zero installations). 
2014] The Military-Environmental Complex 895 
National security as a goal has the ability to stimulate innovation 
through specific demand that broader and more abstract concerns over the 
environment or energy independence may not create. “There is an innova-
tion pull,” said Assistant Secretary of Defense Sharon Burke.72 “We need to 
fight a war—the question is how do we do that. This is more likely to 
stimulate innovation than in a vacuum or for the abstract goal of energy ef-
ficiency—we have a specific problem to solve.”73 
C. Exceptional Opportunities: Lessons from the  
Military-Industrial Complex 
The military’s role in supporting technological innovation that has 
spilled over into the civilian realm is a familiar phenomenon. Technological 
advances originally created for military needs have widely transferred into 
civilian use—including computers, satellites for aerial reconnaissance, cer-
tain kinds of aircraft, the internet, semiconductors, and GPS.74 Although 
perhaps most well-known for this explosion of scientific growth in the 
twentieth century, military stimulation of technological innovation has deep 
historical roots. For example, although the military originally produced its 
own armaments in national armories, beginning in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the Army began to rely on private firms to increase the supply.75 Be-
cause the quality of produced armaments was poor, the Army imposed cer-
tain requirements on manufacturers, including uniformity and the use of 
interchangeable parts.76 This led not only to the development of new guns, 
but also to new “machine tools and precision instruments” which were sub-
sequently adapted to manufacture civilian goods such as sewing machines.77 
The key to obtaining military funding has always been the articulation 
of how the technological innovation is in the military’s interest—or, more 
broadly, in the nation’s interest in national security. Civilian spin-offs have 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Interview with Sharon Burke, supra note 62. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See, e.g., Mowery, supra note 12, at 160, 163–66 (describing the role of the federal govern-
ment in the financing of, and as a customer for, new technological developments, and arguing that 
federal support, as well as weak intellectual property protections and strong antitrust laws, supported 
R&D in certain industries); The Military-Consumer Complex, supra note 13, at 16; Velandy, supra 
note 9, at 309; Tom A. Peter, Military Inventions Hit the Civilian Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(June 19, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Tech-Culture/2008/0619/built-for-battle-but-
perfect-in-peacetime, archived at http://perma.cc/FF62-HPBD; see also supra note 11 (citing sources 
on this point). 
 75 See Merritt Roe Smith, Military Arsenals and Industry Before World War I, in WAR, BUSI-
NESS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 24, 24–32. 
 76 Id. at 31 (noting that as a result of new requirements, many of the old gun manufacturers 
went out of business and were replaced by new upstarts “headed by younger, more aggressive 
businessmen” such as Samuel Colt and Epiphalet Remington). 
 77 Id. at 32. 
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largely been a secondary benefit.78 In some cases, direct federal R&D fund-
ing was not necessary to stimulate the development of these new technolo-
gies.79 Instead, the “prospect of large procurement contracts appears to have 
operated similarly to a prize, leading [one firm] to invest its own funds in 
the development of a product that met military requirements.”80 For exam-
ple, one scholar has explained that government procurement was “crucial” 
in the development of the IBM 650 computer, noting that the federal gov-
ernment agreed to purchase 50 of the 250 machines IBM hoped to sell.81 
But different technologies followed different paths of military funding and 
support. 
Some now argue that the military’s golden age as lead innovator ended 
with changes in federal acquisition rules.82 Today, rather than contracting 
for new, DoD-specific products, the military prefers to adopt preexisting 
civilian technologies—a process that at least one scholar has called “spin-
on” to the military from the private sector, rather than “spin-off” to the pri-
vate sector from the military.83 And sometimes, technology in the military-
industrial complex took hybrid forms—neither completely “spin-off” nor 
“spin-on.”84 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Cf. Timothy Simcoe and Michael W. Toffel, Government Green Procurement Spillovers: Evi-
dence from Municipal Building Policies in California 30–32 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
13-030, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142085, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V4AP-EU3T (arguing that government procurement policies may stimulate the pri-
vate sector’s adoption of environmental standards). It is worth noting that climate change mitigation 
may be less aptly characterized as a secondary benefit if the military is itself concerned about reduc-
ing climate-change-induced conflict. 
 79 See Mowery, supra note 12, at 165. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 174 (noting that the IBM 650 was “the most commercially successful machine” of the 
1950s, with total sales of 1800 units). 
 82 See Stowsky, supra note 13, at 115 (noting the “divergence in performance requirements 
for military and civilian products” by the late 1970s); Tim Lenoir, All but War Is Simulation: The 
Military-Entertainment Complex, 8 CONFIGURATIONS 289, 314–15, 322–23 (2000) (noting a post-
Cold War trend of military adoption of consumer and civilian technologies, especially in war 
games and simulations); David C. Mowery et al., Technology Policy and Global Warming: Why 
New Policy Models Are Needed (Or Why Putting New Wine in Old Bottles Won’t Work), 39 RES. 
POL’Y 1011, 1017 (2010) (describing the R&D programs of the twentieth century as inapt in the 
climate change context). 
 83 Stowsky, supra note 13, at 114–16 (describing the shift in the directional development of 
innovative technology from spin-offs to spin-ons); see Lenoir, supra note 82, at 314 (citing 10 
U.S.C. § 2304 (2012); DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 5000.1 (2000); DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 
No. 5000.2 (2000)) (noting the DoD’s shift away from contracting with segments of the U.S. in-
dustrial sector towards the acquisition of commercially available products); Mowery, supra note 
12, at 169 (“As nondefense demand for semiconductor components grew and came to dominate 
industry demand, defense-to-civilian technology ‘spillovers’ declined in significance and actually 
reversed in direction.”). 
 84 See Stowsky, supra note 13, at 118. 
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For example, after World War II, the Army Signal Corps sought to re-
duce the size and weight of its early walkie-talkies by developing miniature 
components.85 Bell Labs was simultaneously working to develop new tran-
sistor technology “to replace mechanical relays in telephone exchanges.”86 
In 1948, Bell Labs briefed the military regarding this new technology.87 
Subsequently, the Army Signal Corps signed a contract with Bell Labs to 
conduct additional general research, followed by a second contract to de-
vote time to military-specific interests.88 One scholar has noted that while 
the technology initially came from the civilian sector, military procurement 
and interest were crucial to its development and diffusion.89 Bell Labs was 
unable to introduce the new transistors on a widespread scale in the civilian 
telephone system in the absence of demand for large-scale replacement of 
existing infrastructure.90 But the military financed the construction of the 
Western Electric transistor plant in Pennsylvania and persuaded the industry 
to increase its production capacity to more than ten times the military’s ex-
isting needs for transistors in order to have “surge capability” in case of 
emergency.91 In addition, the military essentially subsidized research and 
production costs to bring down the ultimate cost to civilian consumers of 
the technology.92 Finally, the military contributed to the diffusion and dis-
semination of information about transistor technology by requiring Bell 
Labs to hold conferences for representatives of the electronics industry, ac-
ademics, and the military regarding the technology.93 
Given these historical roots, the literature on technological innovation 
has been attuned to the role that the federal government in general, and the 
military specifically, may play in stimulating technological innovation in 
the energy sector to combat climate change.94 This literature recognizes the 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 117. 
 87 Id. at 118. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. Western Electric was AT&T’s manufacturing component. Id. at 119. 
 92 Id. at 119, 121. 
 93 Id. at 119. Bell Labs had initially been concerned about military-imposed secrecy on this 
technology, waiting until one week before a public announcement about its technology develop-
ment to brief the military. Id. at 118. 
 94 See, e.g., John M. Amidon, America’s Strategic Imperative: A “Manhattan Project” for 
Energy, JOINT FORCES Q., Fourth Quarter 2005, at 68, 69 (advocating a Manhattan Project to 
achieve energy independence); Seth Dunn, Hydrogen Futures: Toward a Sustainable Energy Sys-
tem, 27 INT’L J. HYDROGEN ENERGY 235, 238 (2002) (advocating a “catalytic leadership role” for 
the government in studying and developing a hydrogen-based energy economy); Martin I. Hoffert 
et al., Energy Implications of Future Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Content, 395 NATURE 881, 
882, 884 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he magnitude of the implied infrastructure transition suggests the 
need for massive investments in innovative energy research” on the order of a Manhattan project 
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importance of government funding to address the so-called “Commerciali-
zation Valley of Death”: the period between the availability of venture capi-
tal financing for “early stage, potentially high-risk/high-return technolo-
gies” and the availability of bank financing for “late-stage, potentially low-
risk/low-return technologies in the form of project financing.”95 Little pri-
vate financing exists in this period to support “potentially lower-cost break-
through technologies that have advanced out of the laboratory but still re-
quire extensive and expensive field testing and trial installations before be-
ing deployed at scale.”96 
In some respects, this innovation literature constitutes a modern-day 
effort to draw historical lessons from the military-industrial complex and 
apply them to the problems of climate change.97 One common suggestion 
has been the advocacy of an initiative along the lines of the Manhattan Pro-
ject or Apollo Program to support technological innovation on the scale and 
at the pace necessary to solve the climate change problem.98 For some, this 
                                                                                                                           
to develop transformative technologies); Peter Read and Jonathan Lermit, Bio-Energy with Car-
bon Storage (BECS): A Sequential Decision Approach to the Threat of Abrupt Climate Change, 30 
ENERGY 2654, 2654–71 (2005) (modeling a Manhattan Project style response to abrupt climate 
change); Chris Somerville, The Billion-Ton Biofuels Vision, 312 SCIENCE 1277, 1277 (2006) (sug-
gesting a Manhattan Project for biofuels); David Talbot, Needed: An ‘Apollo Program’ for Energy, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 20, 2006), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/405681/needed-an-apollo-
program-for-energy/, archived at http://perma.cc/E34T-5QT4 (“Since World War II, the develop-
ment of everything from gas turbines to integrated circuits to the Internet were all devised by 
R&D paid for by the government. We should target the R&D we need to make the energy system 
sustainable.”). But see Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1019–23 (arguing that a Manhattan Project 
or Apollo Program model is inappropriate for confronting climate change). It is important to note 
that a “Manhattan Project” or “Apollo Program” approach is not synonymous with the Military-
Environmental Complex—to the contrary, the Military-Environmental Complex is not about de-
veloping a single “magic bullet,” but rather describes a web of interaction among different institu-
tional actors working together to develop multiple technologies that reduce energy demand and 
develop or promote alternative energy generation. 
 95 BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., CROSSING THE VALLEY OF DEATH: SOLUTIONS TO THE 
NEXT GENERATION CLEAN ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING GAP 1 (2010). See generally infra notes 
237–353 and accompanying text (exploring the role of the private sector in the Military-Environ-
mental Complex). 
 96 BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., supra note 95, at 1. 
 97 For one example of this literature, see David C. Mowery, Defense-Related R&D as a Model 
for “Grand Challenges” Technology Policies, 41 RES. POL’Y 1703, 1704, 1706, 1711 (2012), who 
highlights military technology innovation success stories going back to Henry VIII, the race for 
armor, the naval arms race between Britain and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and the U.S. transition from public armories to private sources of armaments. 
 98 See supra note 94 (citing sources on this point); see also TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL 
SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS 
OF POSSIBILITY 8 (2007) (noting the authors’ support in 2003 for a “new Apollo project . . . [in-
corporating] major investment in clean-energy jobs, research and development, infrastructure, and 
transit, with the goal of achieving energy independence”). Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellen-
berger had believed that this approach would win over “blue collar swing voters and Reagan 
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so-called “Manhattan Project” approach simply signifies an overwhelming 
investment of societal resources to develop transformational or disruptive 
technological solutions, not necessarily involving government funds.99 Yet 
despite borrowing the well-known terminology of these two historical pro-
grams, these advocates often fail to acknowledge both the role of the gov-
ernment—particularly the military—as a polluter, and the exceptional 
alignment between the military’s mission and the need to reduce energy 
demand and find renewable energy sources in the climate change context.100 
Others reject this Manhattan Project approach to government R&D in-
vestment.101 For example, some scholars contend that while a “strong, well-
resourced government technology policy” is a necessary component of ad-
dressing climate change, the Manhattan Project or Apollo Program models 
are inapposite.102 They contend that such models are “wrongheaded” and 
have the potential to “waste resources” while ultimately being unsuccess-
ful.103 Those twentieth-century programs, these scholars argue, involved the 
quest for a single, precise technological innovation for which the govern-
ment was the “sole customer.”104 In contrast, in the climate change context, 
there is a different need to engage multiple stakeholders, including the pri-
vate sector, state, local, and federal governments, and individuals—not only 
to adopt new technologies, but also to change behavior on a vast, decentral-
ized scale.105 Other critics of a Manhattan Project approach contend that the 
analogy is inapt because the government has historically proven ineffective 
at “pick[ing] winners” untethered from actual demand.106 Arguably, these 
                                                                                                                           
Democrats” in battleground states while “excit[ing] the high-tech creative class at the same time.” 
NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra. 
 99 See Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 73, 119 (1998) (suggesting that private investment will displace government invest-
ment in his proposed Manhattan Project on geoengineering). 
 100 Some scholars recognize the geopolitical instability that may result from climate change. 
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1531, 1576–77 (2009); Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Cli-
mate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 
42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 1117–18 (2012). 
 101 See, e.g., Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1019–23; Chi-Jen Yang & Michael Oppenhei-
mer, A “Manhattan Project” for Climate Change?, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 199, 200 (2007) (reject-
ing a Manhattan Project approach). 
 102 Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1012. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 Yang & Oppenheimer, supra note 101, at 202 (noting that many of the government’s ef-
forts to “pick winners” in commercial markets have failed, but that government intervention to 
support technology development has generally been successful in three situations: “(1) govern-
ment R&D support for technologies in which the government has a strong and direct procurement 
interest; (2) decentralized systems of government-sponsored research in the ‘generic’ area between 
the basic and applied; (3) a decentralized system of clientele-oriented support for applied R&D”). 
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critics fail to appreciate the military’s genuine underlying demand for such 
technology. 
This debate over the utility of a Manhattan Project approach, however, 
does not exhaust the field of potential government roles to support techno-
logical innovation, including models that draw lessons from the military-
industrial complex. Other historical models include public-private interac-
tions, such as government intervention in the development of information 
technology, including military R&D, government procurement, and a com-
bination of both. 107 For example, scholars have recognized that military 
R&D programs were essential in the development of semiconductors, com-
puter hardware, and computer software during the Cold War, which ulti-
mately led to the creation of the internet.108 These scholars understood that 
the military’s national security mission motivated this military investment, 
and that military procurement “dominated early markets” for new products 
using these technologies.109 Other federal agencies, academic institutions, 
and private industry worked together with the military to provide “plural-
istic” support for innovation in information technology.110 Because these 
innovations supported the military mission, R&D and military procurement 
were mutually reinforcing.111 The military’s status as first user of the new 
technologies “enhanced their reliability and ease of use, while reducing 
their costs.”112 Finally, this military-supported innovation led to significant 
civilian “spillover” which ultimately overtook military sales and funding for 
R&D.113 
Despite these successes of combined military R&D and procurement 
in stimulating the growth of the information technology sector, these schol-
ars remain pessimistic about the potential for this model to stimulate tech-
nological innovation in the climate change context.114 They argue that while 
government R&D and procurement can accelerate the development of some 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1016–18. The role of “government” is not confined to 
the military in this literature. To the contrary, there is discussion of other potential successful anal-
ogies from the past, including programs in which U.S. technology policy has been effective, such 
as in public health and agricultural innovation programs. See id. at 1014–16. 
 108 Id. at 1016. 
 109 See id. at 1017. David Mowery has noted that as the military mission shifted, so too did 
the military’s approach to technology. Mowery, supra note 97, at 1705. During wartime, immedi-
ate goals dominated, while during the Cold War, the national defense mission shifted to develop-
ing new and more complex weapons systems, as well as addressing other threats. See id. 
 110 Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1017. 
 111 See id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1017–18. Mowery notes that the scale of government procurement and R&D in the 
Cold War permitted greater experimentation, diversity, and competition among industrial partners 
in technology development. See Mowery, supra note 97, at 1709. 
 114 See Mowery et al., supra note 82, at 1020. 
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technologies, the widespread diffusion of new energy technology will re-
quire other policies reflecting the true social costs of carbon.115 Any public 
spending, they argue, must be accompanied by significant private spending 
on technological innovation, and significant participation by industry in 
“prototype development and testing.”116 The government may play an im-
portant role in field trials of new technology as it did in the information 
technology context,117 yet when the government is involved, there is always 
the possibility of capture.118 If the ultimate goal is to create technology that 
will be used in a decentralized way by both private and public actors, one 
scholar contends that the utility of defense R&D may be “limited,” as 
“[c]ivilian technological ‘spinoffs’ were never a central goal of the postwar 
defense-related R&D spending” by the United States.119 The military, this 
scholar argues, does not generally support diffusion of technology and in-
novation learning.120 Indeed, this scholar expressly argues that procurement 
will play a smaller role in the climate change context than it did in the con-
text of Cold War defense-related technological innovation. 121 Ultimately, 
these arguments appear primarily to be a critique of the efficiency of relying 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1021. 
 118 Id. Mowery offers the example of the difficulty in terminating the Air Force C-17 transport 
plane, as a result of major military contractors carefully distributing the subcontracts and compo-
nent contracts among all fifty states, most importantly those of key committee leaders. See 
Mowery, supra note 97, at 1708–09. 
 119 Mowery, supra note 97, at 1703, 1714. Indeed, Mowery contends that because the mili-
tary’s role in Cold War technological innovation was largely “sui generis,” it is not a good analogy 
to extend to other grand challenges. See id. at 1709, 1714. 
 120 See id. at 1710, 1714. Mowery also argues that technological innovations often need to be 
significantly modified to have civilian application. Id. at 1710. 
 121 Id. at 1705. Mowery does recognize three pathways through which military R&D and 
procurement can stimulate innovation in civilian technologies. Id. at 1711. First, if the military 
supports broad research—rather than seeking to procure a specific weapon system—this can con-
tribute to “general knowledge.” Id. Second, military R&D can lead to the development of civilian 
“spin-offs,” such as in information technology. Id. But see Roberto Mazzoleni, Innovation in the 
Machine Tool Industry: A Historical Perspective on the Dynamics of Comparative Advantage, in 
SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: STUDIES OF SEVEN INDUSTRIES 169, 176, 180–88 (David 
C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 1999) (noting that while the U.S. machine tool industry 
developed in part from the Army’s interest in armaments with interchangeable parts, other tech-
nologies, namely numerical control methods in aircraft manufacture, were slow to be adopted 
outside of the military context); Stowsky, supra note 13, at 114–15 (noting heterogeneity in the 
success of spin-offs from military technology, including success stories, such as semiconductors, 
and failures, such as “Air Force-sponsored computer control technology for machine tools”). 
Third, military procurement enabled industry to improve performance and reduce prices, consider-
ing the military’s focus on performance and its ability to serve as a first customer. Mowery, supra 
note 97, at 1711. Jay Stowsky argues that firms that were too attuned to military procurement 
needs failed to appreciate civilian demand and innovation, and that “spin-on” should be more 
widely recognized as an alternative to “spin-off” for the development of new technology. Stowsky, 
supra note 13, at 115–16. 
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on military R&D and procurement, as opposed to other forms of spending 
that could more directly support technological innovation with civilian im-
plications. Similarly, from one critic’s perspective, the key question is 
which method—spin-off or spin-on—is faster.122 
The question of which approach is “faster” or “more efficient” would 
be a good one if we lived in a world of central planning or a clean slate. But 
by focusing on what institutional arrangement would best stimulate techno-
logical innovation to combat climate change globally, this innovation schol-
arship fails to recognize that the U.S. government, particularly the DoD, is 
already actively stimulating such technological development in the energy 
sector. Despite recognizing the potential analogy to the military-industrial 
complex of the past, especially the extent to which military procurement 
was driven largely by the military’s mission in the twentieth-century devel-
opment of information technology, these scholars fail to realize that the mil-
itary’s mission currently dovetails in an exceptional way with the need to 
reduce energy demand and develop renewable energy sources. 
Thus, this innovation literature—despite its apparent heritage in history 
and theory of the military-industrial complex—is asking the wrong question. 
Rather than asking what in theory is the most efficient way to stimulate tech-
nological innovation that must then be diffused globally, scholars and poli-
cymakers should ask different questions. The real question is: Given that the 
DoD is already both actively pursuing technological innovation to military 
specifications through R&D and exhibiting vast, mission-driven demand for 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies through procurement and creative ar-
rangements like long-term Power Purchase Agreements (“PPAs”), how 
should policymakers craft institutions and rules to make this government-
sponsored innovation more successful? And how can policymakers guard 
against abuses such as rent-seeking, cost overruns and delays, and the lack of 
diffusion of knowledge that may have plagued government-supported innova-
tion in the past? This Article seeks to address these questions here. 
D. Advantages of the Military-Environmental Complex 
There are certain unique advantages to military participation in this 
technological innovation process. First, the mere fact that a project supports 
military interests—rather than general commercial interests—may drive sup-
port among key institutional players who feel more strongly connected to 
the value of protecting national security than other values such as support-
ing commerce or protecting the environment.123 The construction of roads 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Stowsky, supra note 13, at 137. 
 123 For a further discussion of this issue, see generally Light, supra note 27. See also Dena M. 
Gromet, Howard Kunreuther, & Richard P. Larrick, Political Ideology Affects Energy-Efficiency 
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in nineteenth-century America provides an example of how an engineering 
project with both civilian and military applications obtained congressional 
funding and presidential support largely because of its alignment with the 
military’s mission.124 The original thirteen colonies constructed few roads, 
except those built by the military and for the Lancaster-Philadelphia Turn-
pike.125 As a result, during the War of 1812, the nation faced challenges in 
moving soldiers and supplies. This difficulty led to a rethinking of the mili-
tary’s need for roads and a reconsideration of the role the federal—as op-
posed to state—government should play in financing and constructing 
them.126 According to one scholar, “As long as a road could be termed a 
military road, [President James] Madison and the Congress would approve 
its construction . . . . When road construction was labeled an internal im-
provement . . . Madison vetoed the measure even though Congress had 
passed it.”127 President James Monroe followed the same path, approving 
“only those roads which were described as strictly military,”128 even after 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, in an 1819 report to Congress, wrote: 
A judicious system of roads and canals, constructed for the con-
venience of commerce and the transportation of the mail only, 
without any reference to the military operations is itself among 
the most efficient means for “the more complete defense of the 
United States.” . . . [T]he roads and canals which such a system 
                                                                                                                           
Attitudes and Choices, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 9314, 9314–17 (2013) (finding that indi-
viduals with conservative ideologies were less likely to purchase energy-efficient light bulbs when 
the light bulbs were affixed with a sticker stating “Protect the Environment” than when no sticker 
was present); Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 
147, 169 (2011) (“When shown risk information (e.g., global temperatures are increasing) that 
[people] associate with a conclusion threatening to their cultural values (commerce must be con-
strained), individuals tend to react dismissively toward that information; however, when shown 
that the information in fact supports or is consistent with a conclusion that affirms their cultural 
values (society should rely more on nuclear power), such individuals are more likely to consider 
the information open-mindedly.” (citations omitted)); Edward W. Maibach et al., Communication 
and Marketing as Climate Change–Intervention Assets: A Public Health Perspective, 35 AM. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. 488, 497 (2008) (noting that “[a]udiences are most receptive to content that is 
consistent with their existing attitudes and beliefs,” and suggesting the wisdom of selecting mes-
sages about climate change based on the values of the target audience, including values concern-
ing economics, energy independence, legacy, stewardship, religion, and nationalism). In Valuing 
National Security, I hypothesize that the ability to link reducing demand for fossil fuels and pro-
moting alternative sources of energy with advancing national security goals may affect support for 
climate change mitigation policies and behaviors not only among key players in Congress, but 
also among members of the public. See generally Light, supra note 27. 
 124 Thomas E. Kelly, The Concrete Road to MIC; National Defense and Federal Highways, in 
WAR, BUSINESS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 133, 134–35. 
 125 Id. at 134. 
 126 See id. at 134–35. 
 127 Id. at 135. 
 128 Id. 
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would require are precisely those which would be required for the 
operations of war.129 
The role of the military in stimulating technological innovation, as well as 
in unlocking financing, has thus been exceptional. But on a deeper level, to 
extrapolate to the clean energy context from the experience of nineteenth-
century road building, reliance on the synergy between the military’s inter-
ests and energy conservation may provide political cover for those who oth-
erwise might not support investment in clean energy technology solely for 
civilian purposes or environmental reasons. 
Second, the DoD’s exceptional hierarchical nature allows its leadership 
to consider the importance of changing norms and behavior in ways that 
might be unthinkable in the private sector. In the military context, behavior-
al changes are within the realm of possibility in ways that might be hard to 
fathom in the civilian world. One well-known historical example is the in-
tegration of the military long before parts of the civilian world in the United 
States. For example, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 
on July 26, 1948, formally abolishing segregation in the military even while 
so-called “Jim Crow” laws were still widely in force in parts of America.130 
By issuing an executive order and exploiting the hierarchical nature of his 
relationship with the military as Commander-in-Chief, Truman was able to 
have an impact on behavior and attitudes toward racial integration that, 
some scholars argue, spilled over into the civilian realm.131 
Though this formal document in no way actually ended segregation 
overnight, the military acted as a norm-leader in the integration of public 
life in the United States in ways that arguably had a positive impact on the 
civilian world. More recent studies have demonstrated that adoption of 
“green” standards that apply only to government may spill over into the 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. 
 130 Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943–1948); see MICHAEL R. GARDNER, HARRY 
TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MORAL COURAGE AND POLITICAL RISKS 105–21 (2002) (exploring 
the impetus for, and consequences of, President Truman’s executive order); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, 
RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 177–
202 (2004) (exploring President Truman’s civil rights legacy). 
 131 Cf. SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY 
LIFE 594–95 (1949) (finding that greater levels of contact between white and black soldiers in the 
U.S. military correlated with greater support for racial integration); John Sibley Butler & Kenneth 
L. Wilson, The American Soldier Revisited: Race Relations and the Military, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 451, 
465 (1975) (reaffirming the “contact thesis” by which integration within the military among peo-
ple of different races, but equal rank and status, reduced negative racial attitudes prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Racial 
Integration in the Armed Forces, 72 AM. J. SOC. 132, 139–40 (1966) (noting a significant increase 
in support for integration among both whites and African Americans in the U.S. military between 
1943 and 1951, and suggesting that this radical shift was a precipitating factor in the civil rights 
movement in the United States). 
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civilian realm even in the absence of mandates on private firms. For exam-
ple, two researchers found that the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leader-
ship in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) Standard for Green 
Buildings diffused more rapidly among private developers in municipalities 
that adopted green procurement policies that applied only to the government 
than in municipalities without such procurement policies, and that these 
policies also spilled over into neighboring communities.132 They concluded 
that “government purchasing policies can break deadlocks that emerge 
when coordinated investments are required to adopt a common standard and 
that adoption stimulates the private-sector market for the goods and services 
targeted by those policies.”133 
In the clean energy context, exceptional behavioral changes may like-
wise be possible. As Sharon Burke explained: 
The civilian world is different—it is hard to talk about reorganiz-
ing society—to tell people you can’t live so far away from work 
because you use too much fuel. In the military you can talk about 
this. Changing behavior is all about having a tool, explaining why 
it matters, and taking the lesson with you.134 
To illustrate this principle, Burke told the story of a Senior Officer who was 
field-testing energy equipment at a Marine Corps base in southern Califor-
nia.135 The Senior Officer was explaining to the Marines involved how to 
use a new electricity meter to measure their energy use: 
He said to them, “Do what you have to do, use the energy you 
need to get the job done, but if you stay below that red line, you 
won’t turn on the generator. No noise, no fumes, no fuel truck 
coming by to refill it.” And they get that—many of them have 
been deployed before and had to live next to a generator. The Ma-
rines stayed below the line . . . . People talk about culture change, 
but it’s not enough to tell people to do better; you have to give 
them the tools and the rationale. . . . U.S. forces are very, very 
good at the logistics of fuel, of moving what we need to operate 
from place to place. We also have a great deal of experience in 
managing energy use in our fixed facilities, and in fact, we are of-
ten compelled to do so by laws and regulations. But we didn’t 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Simcoe & Toffel, supra note 78, at 1–2. See generally LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUN-
CIL, http://www.usgbc.org/leed, archived at http://perma.cc/NPY5-8SD5 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
 133 Id. at 3. 
 134 Interview with Sharon Burke, supra note 62. 
 135 Id. 
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have much experience managing energy as a military capability, 
enabler, or input.136  
As this example makes clear, a key element of the Military-Environmental 
Complex is about developing tools to encourage management of energy as 
an input. 
The military’s ability to reduce energy use, particularly from conven-
tional sources such as petroleum in combat operations and existing electrici-
ty grids at military installations, is vital to national security, at least in the 
short run. In the long run, the Military-Environmental Complex may have 
important consequences for development and commercialization of clean 
energy technology and practices with widespread civilian application. 137 
The challenge is to recognize this military exceptionalism and to ask 
whether and how it can be harnessed. 
II. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES DRIVING THE  
MILITARY-ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEX 
The DoD is actively engaged in reducing its energy consumption, in-
creasing efficiency, and promoting renewables in order to support its mis-
sion. This Part assesses the governmental institutions and values driving the 
Military-Environmental Complex. 
A. Government Institutions 
Congress, the President, and the DoD all play significant roles in the 
Military-Environmental Complex. These institutions are deeply engaged in 
a debate over the values that should drive the DoD’s actions within the 
Military-Environmental Complex: national security, energy independence, 
cost, or environmental protection. 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Id. Burke pointed out that the protection of fuel lines was an important concern for both 
the Axis and Allied powers in World War II; the Allies were much more successful at protecting 
access to fuel, whereas by the end of the war, the Germans were brewing fuel from coal and the 
Japanese from pine roots and tires. Id.; see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST 
FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 345–46, 348 (2009) (describing the desperation of Japan’s pine root 
campaign). 
 137 This Article does not claim that military leadership is the sole solution to the problem of 
climate change. Rather, there is a story here to tell about the importance of taking a pluralistic 
approach without awaiting a first-best global solution. Cf. Orts, supra note 15, at 199, 205 & n.22. 
2014] The Military-Environmental Complex 907 
1. Congressional Mandates 
Despite its inability to pass comprehensive climate-change legislation 
governing the private sector,138 Congress has played a key role in the Mili-
tary-Environmental Complex, both substantively—in directing the military to 
meet conservation and sustainability goals—and procedurally—by strength-
ening the institutions within the DoD that can make those goals self-
reinforcing. Congress has imposed a number of mandates on all federal agen-
cies to promote conservation, efficiency, and the development of renewable 
energy sources. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act,139 as amended 
by, inter alia, the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988,140 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”),141 and the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”),142 provides the underlying framework 
and authority for energy conservation and efficiency by federal agencies.143 
Noting that the federal government is the nation’s “largest energy consum-
er,”144 these statutes require all federal agencies, including the military, to 
conserve energy and water in federal facilities;145 create a federal energy effi-
ciency fund to provide grants to agencies for such projects;146 establish an In-
teragency Energy Management Task Force to assist in implementation;147 pro-
cure Energy Star products or Federal Energy Management Program 
(“FEMP”)-designated products;148 and establish government contract incen-
tives to encourage contractor-operated government facilities to reduce federal 
                                                                                                                           
 138 For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the Wax-
man-Markey cap-and-trade bill, passed in the House but was defeated on the Senate floor. H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (2009); see American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454, archived at http://perma.cc/CTQ4-HHPV (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2014). Other efforts to address climate change at the federal level have come largely as a 
result of presidential and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action under the existing Clean Air 
Act, rather than through new legislation. See Regulatory Initiatives, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G6XD-E9W8 (last updated 
Sept. 24, 2013) (describing the EPA’s recent regulatory initiatives to address climate change). 
 139 National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, §§ 541–551, 92 
Stat. 3206, 3277–80 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8251–8261 (2006 & Supp. V)). 
 140 Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-615, § 2(a), 102 
Stat. 3185, 3185–89 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8251–8261). 
 141 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 101–105, 119 Stat. 594, 605–11 (2005) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8253–8259b). 
 142 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 431, 432, 434, 
441, 511, 516, 524, 525, 121 Stat. 1492, 1607–11, 1614–15, 1623, 1658, 1659, 1662–63 (2007) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8253–8259b). 
 143 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 8251–8261. 
 144 Id. § 8251(1). 
 145 Id. § 8253. 
 146 Id. § 8256(b). 
 147 Id. § 8257. 
 148 Id. § 8259b. 
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energy costs.149 The EPAct of 2005 also requires the government to generate 
or purchase its electricity with increasing levels of new renewable energy 
sources.150 Other examples of general directives to federal agencies include 
the requirement for agencies to reduce non-tactical fleet vehicle petroleum 
use by 20% by fiscal year 2015,151 and the requirement in Section 431 of 
EISA that federal buildings reduce energy intensity by 30% by fiscal year 
2015 compared to a baseline of fiscal year 2003 emissions.152 
In addition to congressional directives that apply broadly to all federal 
agencies, Congress has directed the DoD alone to reduce energy demand 
and develop alternative renewable energy sources, primarily in its facilities. 
For example, Congress directed the DoD “to produce or procure not less 
than 25 percent of the total quantity of facility energy it consumes within its 
facilities during fiscal year 2025 and each fiscal year thereafter from renew-
able energy sources . . . .”153 Congress directed the DoD to consider using 
solar or other forms of renewable energy for facilities construction projects, 
including housing;154 to use energy-efficient (Energy Star/FEMP) products 
in such housing;155 and to prefer energy-efficient equipment generally.156 
Congress also mandated that the DoD prefer hybrid, electric, or plug-in ve-
hicles that are of reasonable cost and meet departmental needs.157 
Congress has provided financial incentives for the DoD to meet these 
goals158 and requires annual progress reports159 as well as the development 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id. § 8256(a). 
 150 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 203, 119 Stat. 594, 652–53 (2005) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15852 (2006)) (requiring that, “to the extent economically feasible 
and technically practicable, of the total amount of electric energy the Federal Government con-
sumes during any fiscal year,” the government must consume not less than 3% renewable energy 
in fiscal years 2007 through 2009, not less than 5% in fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and not less 
than 7.5% in fiscal year 2013 and each fiscal year thereafter); see also Jeremy S. Scholtes, On 
Point for the Nation: Army and Renewable Energy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 55, 62–63 (2013) (describing 
the history of mandates for renewables). 
 151 42 U.S.C. § 6374e (2006). 
 152 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 431, 121 Stat. 
1492, 1607 (2007) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8253(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V)). Although 
Congressional mandates set the floor, notably the DoD has sought to exceed that floor. The DoD 
Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan raises the bar, requiring the DoD to reduce energy inten-
sity by 37.5 percent. See SSPP FY 2010, supra note 6, at II-7. 
 153 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (2012). 
 154 Id. § 2915(a); see also id. § 2922f (governing the procurement of energy systems using 
renewable forms of energy). 
 155 Id. § 2915(e). 
 156 Id. § 2922b. 
 157 Id. § 2922g (providing that this preference does not apply to “tactical vehicles designed for 
use in combat”). 
 158 Id. §§ 2912, 2916. 
 159 Id. § 2911(a). 
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of an energy master plan,160 but it has not otherwise spelled out any en-
forcement mechanisms.161 For example, to the extent that the DoD realizes 
energy cost savings from the measures it implements, the DoD may reinvest 
half of those cost savings into additional conservation measures without 
further congressional appropriations, and half of the cost savings into loca-
tion-specific improvements for service members.162 In addition, the DoD is 
permitted to sell to a utility company the electricity it produces from alter-
native or cogeneration facilities under the DoD’s jurisdiction, and to credit 
any proceeds to the appropriation account for the supply of electricity.163 
Perhaps most importantly for the DoD’s ability to utilize private fi-
nancing for major renewable energy projects, Congress has authorized the 
DoD to enter into thirty-year Power Purchase Agreements (“PPAs”) with 
private developers to promote the development of alternative energy gen-
eration on military lands.164 These agreements are contracts for the “provi-
sion and operation of energy production facilities on real property under the 
Secretary’s jurisdiction or on private property and the purchase of energy 
produced from such facilities.”165 The DoD is unique among federal agen-
cies in its ability to enter into such long-term PPAs. Other agencies, in con-
trast, are limited to shorter contracts, which have not provided the necessary 
incentives for private financiers to invest in these projects because initial 
investments can only be recouped on a longer time horizon.166 
These congressional mandates echo the exemptions in the environmen-
tal laws noted above in that they do not apply to the military’s use of opera-
tional energy (the energy used when the military is acting as a warfighter). 
Rather, they apply only to the military’s use of energy to power its facilities 
in a noncombat capacity.167 At first glance, one might think that this reflects 
tension between the military’s mission and clean energy goals. To under-
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id. § 2911(b). 
 161 Congress requires the DoD to consider a number of special factors in formulating the mas-
ter plan, including reducing consumption, reducing demand, implementing conservation measures, 
using alternative energy sources and fuels as well as hybrid and electric vehicles, managing and 
constructing facilities to conserve energy, reducing costs and achieving economies of scale, 
providing incentives to service members and civilians to reduce energy consumption, and increas-
ing energy security. Id. § 2911(c). 
 162 Id. § 2912. 
 163 Id. § 2916. 
 164 Id. § 2922a. 
 165 Id. This specific authorization by Congress is necessary to avoid violating the Antidefi-
ciency Act, which prohibits the obligation of funds in excess of an appropriation without authori-
zation. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); see Geraldine E. Edens et al., Government Purchasing of Effi-
cient Products and Renewable Energy, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEW-
ABLES 123 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). 
 166 See infra notes 260–289 and accompanying text. 
 167 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (governing reduction in facility energy use); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 8253(a) (2006 & Supp. V) (governing energy performance requirements for federal buildings). 
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stand why this picture is not fully accurate, it is important to appreciate the 
distinction between operational energy and facilities energy.168 Operational 
energy is “energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military 
forces and weapons platforms for military operations. The term includes 
energy used by tactical power systems and generators and weapons plat-
forms.”169 The DoD has explained that “[i]n practice, the Department con-
siders operational energy to be the energy used in [m]ilitary deployments, 
across the full spectrum of missions; [d]irect support of military deploy-
ments; and [t]raining in support of unit readiness for military deployments.”170 
In contrast, facilities energy “includes energy needed to power fixed instal-
lations and non-tactical vehicles.”171 Operational energy accounts for approx-
imately 75% of DoD energy use, while facilities energy accounts for the 
remaining 25%.172 
The line between facilities energy and operational energy can be blur-
ry. For example, the military employs unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly 
known as “drones,” which may be remotely piloted by personnel sitting in a 
facility within the United States.173 Although a domestic military installa-
tion’s energy use might normally be considered facilities energy, if the facil-
ity is engaged in a national security function or military operations (such as 
piloting a drone), such engagement could arguably transform the energy use 
into operational energy. 
Another way that Congress has treated operational energy differently is 
through rules regarding federal buildings, which are exempt from energy 
conservation and efficiency requirements if they are used in the perfor-
mance of a national security function,174 an exemption that dovetails with 
the facilities/operations distinction, though in different language. In addi-
tion, Congress’s goal that the DoD produce or procure 25% of its energy 
from renewable sources by 2025 applies only to energy that powers military 
facilities, not operations.175 Furthermore, federal agencies are required by 
statute to procure Energy Star or FEMP-designated products unless the agen-
                                                                                                                           
 168 Not only do congressional mandates differ based upon the type of energy used, but each 
type of energy is managed out of a different office within the DoD. See infra notes 186–194 and 
accompanying text. 
 169 10 U.S.C. §§ 138c(h)(1), 2924(5). 
 170 ENERGY FOR THE WARFIGHTER, supra note 63, at 3. 
 171 AEMR FY 2012, supra note 52, at 15 n.2. 
 172 ENERGY FOR THE WARFIGHTER, supra note 63, at 3. 
 173 See SSPP FY 2010, supra note 6, at I-2; Interview with John Lushetsky, supra note 69 
(“The lines have become blurred, but there is a critical role for installations to fulfill—it’s not just 
about keeping guys in barracks in peacetime.”). 
 174 42 U.S.C. § 8253(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. V). 
 175 See 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (2012). 
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cy head determines in writing that a statutory exception applies.176 Yet in 
defining “product” for purposes of the Energy Star program, Congress ex-
cluded “any energy consuming product or system designed or procured for 
combat or combat-related missions.”177 Other similar exemptions for opera-
tional energy use are widespread. 
2. Presidential Directives 
Congress is not the only political institution shaping the Military-Envi-
ronmental Complex. The President has likewise played a role, directing all 
federal agencies, including the DoD, to improve their energy profiles and 
thereby lead the nation by example. For example, in 2009, President Barack 
Obama signed Executive Order 13,514, which requires all federal agencies 
to disclose greenhouse gas emissions information annually from their direct 
and indirect activities.178 The order also directs each agency to propose to 
the White House agency-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets 
to reach by fiscal year 2020 as compared to a fiscal year 2008 baseline.179 
The executive order, however, includes a number of exemptions from these 
reduction targets for national security and military operations, including for 
particular facilities and for military tactical vehicle fleets,180 where the ex-
emption would be “in the interest of national security.”181 
Executive Order 13,423, signed by President George W. Bush in 2007, 
similarly directed federal agencies to improve energy efficiency, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and water consumption, acquire sustainable 
goods, and maintain sustainable federal vehicle fleets. 182  That executive 
order also expanded the requirement in the EPAct of 2005 that federal agen-
cies consume certain set percentages of energy from renewable sources by 
requiring that at least half of the renewable energy come from “new” re-
newable sources, defined as “sources of renewable energy placed into ser-
                                                                                                                           
 176 42 U.S.C. § 8259b(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (Energy Star program). Section 104 of 
the EPAct of 2005 further directed the DOE to promulgate regulations carrying out the statute, 
which the DOE finalized on March 13, 2009. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 
§ 104, 119 Stat. 594, 609–11 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8259b); Federal Pro-
curement of Energy Efficient Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,830 (Mar. 13, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. 
pt. 436). 
 177 42 U.S.C. § 8259b(a)(5). 
 178 Executive Order on Sustainability, supra note 37. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Exempted vehicles are “vehicles used in combat support, combat service support, tactical 
or relief operations, or training for such operations.” Id. 
 181 Id. (“To the maximum extent practicable, and without compromising national security, 
each agency shall strive to comply with the purposes, goals, and implementation steps in this or-
der.” (emphasis added)). 
 182  Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, Exec. 
Order No. 13,423, 3 C.F.R. 193 (2008). 
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vice after January 1, 1999.”183 That order, however, expressly excludes ac-
tivities and resources outside the United States and permits the head of an 
agency to exempt military tactical vehicle fleets from its requirements.184 
If one were to look only at the story revealed in these statutes, regula-
tions, and executive orders, one would imagine the DoD to be an institution 
that is only obligated to conserve and reduce its energy use outside of op-
erations. Such a view obscures the military’s significant internal initiatives 
to reduce its energy use, render energy use more efficient, change behavior, 
and stimulate innovation and development of clean technology—not only in 
its facilities, but in operations as well. This facet of the Military-Environ-
mental Complex is driven in large part by the DoD’s own mission, not sole-
ly by external legal mandate.185 
3. Operational Energy 
Indeed, although Congress and the President largely exempted opera-
tional energy from substantive mandates to reduce energy intensity, develop 
renewable fuel sources, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Congress 
took a procedural tack to encourage the military to reduce operational ener-
gy use. In the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Congress created a new Office of Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs (“OEPP”) within the DoD.186 OEPP serves as a mechanism to 
render the goals of reducing demand and pursuing alternative energy 
sources self-sustaining within the agency, even if Congress does not or can-
not mandate reductions in the operational sphere.187 
Congress tasked OEPP Director to “provide leadership and facilitate 
communication regarding, and conduct oversight to manage and be ac-
countable for, operational energy plans and programs within the Department 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id.; see Scholtes, supra note 150, at 62–63 (describing the Army’s response to these legal 
changes). 
 184  Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, Exec. 
Order No. 13,423, 3 C.F.R. 193 (2008). 
 185 This is not to say that the Military-Environmental Complex represents an argument for 
non-regulation of polluters outside of the military context. In this case, the military’s interest in 
national security dovetails with environmental goals of conservation. The same may or may not be 
true in other contexts, such as with respect to private firms. 
 186 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-
417, § 902, 122 Stat. 4356, 4564–66 (2008). 
 187 Cf. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 435–45 (1989) (arguing that the legislature can best control agencies by creating struc-
tural and procedural constraints). In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
Congress redesignated the Director as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy 
Plans and Programs. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 111-383, § 901(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 4137, 4317 (2011). 
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of Defense and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps,” and to 
“establish the operational energy strategy” for the DoD.188 Congress further 
directed each service within the military to designate a senior official re-
sponsible for operational energy matters within that service to report to the 
new Director.189 Finally, Congress directed the DoD to prepare an annual 
report on operational energy to Congress, detailing “[s]tatistical information 
on operational energy demands,” “[a]n estimate of operational energy de-
mands for the current fiscal year and next fiscal year,” descriptions of any 
initiatives taken pursuant to the operational energy strategy and of funding 
for those initiatives, an “evaluation of progress” made by the DoD in im-
plementation and scientific development, and any recommendations of the 
OEPP Director.190 
In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress reported its “sense” that: 
The demand for operational energy within the Department of De-
fense imposes significant logistical burdens and operational vul-
nerabilities on the warfighter and increases force protection re-
quirements. . . . In March 2008, the Comptroller General of the 
United States found that responsibilities for operational energy 
strategy, management, and oversight within the Department are 
diffused throughout various offices and working groups.191 
In support of this “sense,” Congress cited the Defense Science Board’s 2008 
report titled “More Fight—Less Fuel,”192 which stated that: 
Decisions that create energy demand are dispersed organizational-
ly across the Department and throughout the Services. There is no 
unifying vision, strategy, metrics or governance structure with en-
terprise-wide energy in its portfolio. . . . There are currently few 
efforts to manage energy demand by operational forces, which 
consume about three quarters of DoD energy, perhaps because no 
one is in charge.193 
Thus, Congress created OEPP to consolidate these strategic concerns and 
decision making in one office and to report directly to the Secretary of De-
                                                                                                                           
 188 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 § 902(a). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. § 331. 
 191 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 903(a), 
123 Stat. 2190, 2423–24 (2009). 
 192 Id. § 903(a)(3). 
 193 See DEF. SCI. BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DOD EN-
ERGY STRATEGY: MORE FIGHT—LESS FUEL 4 (2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/
reports/ADA477619.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZH5-DK44. 
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fense.194 Yet this push to promote the focus on operational energy through 
procedural mechanisms, such as the creation of a special office and the re-
quirement of information disclosure in the form of reporting, did not come 
from Congress—it came largely from within the military itself. 
4. The DoD’s Role as Self-Driver 
The roles of Congress and the President as institutional drivers have 
been crucial to the Military-Environmental Complex. As noted above, how-
ever, the DoD itself has internal incentives to reduce energy demand, in-
crease efficiency, and explore alternative sources of fuel. Long before Con-
gress created the OEPP or required reporting on operational energy use, 
military commanders serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan sought to de-
crease reliance on fuels out of a concern for soldiers’ lives and the mission. 
In 2003, James Mattis, who served as Marine Corps Commanding General, 
First Marine Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom, declared that the DoD 
must “unleash us from the tether of fuel.”195 In July 2006, Marine Corps 
General Major Richard Zilmer, who at the time was the Commander of 
Multinational Force West in Iraq, sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” rapid re-
source response request, asking for a “renewable and self-sustainable ener-
gy solution . . . to augment our use of fossil fuels with renewable energy, 
such as photovoltaic solar panels and wind turbines” so that fewer troops 
would die guarding fuel convoys in the theater of war.196 In 2008, oil prices 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 §§ 903(a)(4)–(5), 903(b). In 
contrast, the DoD’s policy for facilities energy is carried out through the Office of the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (“DUSD”) for Installations and Environment, currently headed by 
Acting DUSD John Conger. See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 4170.11, at 6 (Dec. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/417011p.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/TNE6-X3GT (describing the responsibilities of the DUSD for Installations and Environment); 
Facilities Energy Policy and Program Guidance, OFF. OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF 
DEF., INSTALLATIONS AND ENV’T., http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/energy/about.shtml, archived at http://
perma.cc/M6MQ-QYSB (last updated Dec. 20, 2012) (listing key statutes, executive orders, re-
ports, DoD Instructions, and other sources guiding the activities of the Office of the DUSD for 
Installations and Environment). 
 195 See DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 193; Kenneth Hudak, Lengthening the Tether of Fuel in 
Afghanistan, ARMY SUSTAINMENT MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 24, 24; Bill Lynn, Energy for the 
War Fighter: The Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(June 14, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/14/energy-war-fighter-depart
ment-defense-operational-energy-strategy, archived at http://perma.cc/45U7-GBMT; Louis Peck, 
New Mission for U.S. Military: Breaking Its Dependence on Oil, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 8, 2010), 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/new_mission_for_us_military_breaking_its_dependence_on_oil/2348/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KR5V-MFNV. 
 196 Paul McLeary, Army and Marines Go Fossil Fuel-Free, WORLDWATERSOLAR.COM (May 24, 
2011), http://www.worldwatersolar.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/PEAK-Army-And-Marines-Go-
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ENVTL. POLICY INST., supra note 63, at 1 (“MG Zilmer’s request was to reduce the amount of fuel 
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spiked to a high of $145 per barrel.197 This brought the cost issue to a head. 
In 2008, Congress responded to these requests from the DoD in the annual 
NDAA, directing the creation of OEPP to focus on ways to reduce and im-
prove operational energy use.198 In 2010, President Obama formally estab-
lished OEPP, naming Sharon Burke as its inaugural head.199 
The DoD has also responded to this institutional prodding from the 
President and Congress. For example, in August 2010, in response to the 
President’s Executive Order on Sustainability, the DoD prepared the De-
partment of Defense’s first Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, which 
explicitly incorporates these underlying values: “Freeing warfighters from 
the tether of fuel will significantly improve our mission effectiveness, as 
will reducing our installations’ dependence on costly fossil fuels and a po-
tentially fragile power grid.”200 In June 2011, consistent with the mandate 
Congress set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 138c,201 the DoD set forth its Operational 
Energy Strategy, which was aptly titled “Energy for the Warfighter.”202 That 
strategy lays out the overarching aim of achieving greater energy security in 
operations through improved information about actual energy use; programs 
to reduce energy consumption and increase efficiency; the development of 
alternative fuel sources and infrastructure protection at key military installa-
tions; and the incorporation of operational energy issues into DoD-wide 
planning, requisitioning, and procurement.203 The DoD’s Operational Ener-
gy Strategy identifies key challenges that the DoD faces with respect to op-
erational energy needs.204 One challenge is the exponential rise in demand 
for energy in the theater of war resulting from the use of new technology, 
including significant increases in the number and weight of batteries.205 
In March 2012, the DoD published its Operational Energy Strategy 
Implementation Plan, which outlined in greater detail how the DoD intend-
                                                                                                                           
needed in order to save lives; in effect, he asked that DoD measure the cost of fuel in blood, not dol-
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 198 See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text. 
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 203 See id. at 1–10. 
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 205 See id. at 4. 
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ed to accomplish these three broad objectives. 206 In order to achieve its 
goals, the DoD committed to gathering data about energy use; increasing 
efficiency in operations; promoting operational energy innovation through 
science and technology to reduce demand, improve efficiency, and develop 
alternative sources of energy; improving energy security at fixed installa-
tions; promoting alternative fuels; 207  incorporating energy security into 
planning, requirements, and acquisition; and adopting policy and education-
al initiatives.208 
5. Coordination with Other Agencies 
The DoD has committed to working in concert with other federal agencies 
to promote the development of new technologies to reduce energy demand and 
intensity, to make use of military lands for large-scale renewable energy pro-
jects, and otherwise to promote national energy security. Most important in this 
regard, the DoD has entered into three Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) 
with other agencies: the Department of Energy (“DOE”),209 the Department of 
the Interior (“DOI”),210 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).211 
The MOU with the DOE aims to strengthen coordination efforts in ar-
eas such as “energy efficiency, renewable energy, water efficiency, fossil 
fuels, alternative fuels, efficient transportation technologies and fueling in-
frastructure, grid security, smart grid, storage, waste-to-energy, basic sci-
ence research, mobile/deployable power, small modular reactor nuclear en-
ergy, and related areas.”212 This includes using military installations as a 
“test bed to demonstrate and create a market for innovative energy efficien-
cy and renewable energy technologies coming out of DOE laboratories” and 
                                                                                                                           
 206 DEP’T OF DEF., OPERATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1–7 (2012) 
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 209 DOE MOU, supra note 26, at 1. 
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 212 DOE MOU, supra note 26, at 1. 
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other sources.213 The partnership permits the DOE to hasten the develop-
ment of new technologies through the DoD’s pilot testing, collaboration, 
and deployment of these technologies.214 In recognizing the importance of 
energy security, the MOU expressly relies on the Military-Environmental 
Complex, noting that energy efficiency can “serve as a force multiplier, in-
creasing the range and endurance of forces in the field while reducing the 
number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines . . . . Solv-
ing military challenges through innovation has the potential to yield spin-off 
technologies that benefit the civilian community as well.”215 
The MOU with the DOI provides that the two agencies will cooperate 
to “facilitate appropriate, mission-compatible renewable energy develop-
ment on public lands withdrawn for defense-related purposes . . . and other 
onshore and offshore areas near or adjacent to DoD military installa-
tions.”216 In particular, the DoD has committed to work with the Bureau of 
Land Management to develop a pilot project for authorizing solar projects 
on military installations in California and Arizona,217 as well as other types 
of renewable energy projects harnessing solar, wind, geothermal, and bio-
mass energy.218 The MOU parties recognize that a contract with the military 
could “mitigate some financial risk to a project by providing a significant 
customer whose energy needs are predictable and consistent.”219 Finally, the 
DoD’s MOU with the EPA focuses on using the DoD’s installations as “test 
beds for innovative technologies and approaches” to support the develop-
ment of sustainable infrastructure.220 
B. Values: “Unleash Us From the Tether of Fuel” 
The values driving these governmental actors to pursue policies that 
reinforce the Military-Environmental Complex are both complementary and 
in conflict. Although the DoD’s primary driver is its mission, including 
risks to national security arising from climate change, other players in the 
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Military-Environmental Complex may care more about other values, such 
as energy independence or cost. This conflict over values came to a head in 
debates over a controversial provision of EISA that prohibited federal agen-
cies from purchasing petroleum from any source that emitted more green-
house gases over its lifecycle than conventional petroleum.221 Evidencing 
the DoD’s primary motivation of mission, rather than energy independence 
or cost, the DoD advocated retaining the provision.222 Repeal of the provi-
sion would have permitted the DoD to procure petroleum from Canadian tar 
sands, which would have advanced the goal of energy independence but 
perpetuated reliance on fossil fuels. In response to a House bill proposing to 
revoke the ban (or bar the use of funding to implement it), the DoD ex-
plained its position: “Repeal or exemption could hamper the Department’s 
efforts to provide better energy options to our warfighters and further in-
crease America’s reliance on non-renewable fuels. Our dependence on those 
types of fuels degrades our national security, negatively impacts our econ-
omy, and harms the environment.”223 
For the DoD, climate change is a source of geopolitical instability that 
affects the military’s mission.224 The DoD has played a key role in the Mili-
tary-Environmental Complex as a validator of climate science. In February 
2010, for instance, the DoD issued its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
which concluded: 
First, climate change will shape the operating environment, roles, 
and missions that we undertake. . . . Assessments conducted by 
the intelligence community indicate that climate change could 
have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contrib-
uting to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further 
weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contrib-
ute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, 
and may spur or exacerbate mass migration. While climate 
change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant 
of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 526, 121 Stat. 
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institutions and militaries around the world. . . . Second, DoD will 
need to adjust to the impacts of climate change on our facilities 
and military capabilities. . . . DoD’s operational readiness hinges 
on continued access to land, air, and sea training and test space.225 
The DoD thus recognizes that climate change can accelerate conflict in 
ways that affect the national security of the United States.226 Recent news 
reports about the Russian Navy patrolling newly opened shipping lanes in 
the Arctic Ocean underscore the impact of climate change on potential new 
areas of conflict.227 The solution, from the DoD’s perspective, is to reduce 
demand for energy, to increase energy efficiency, and to use renewable fuels 
that do not require the same long “tail” to bring to the theater of war.228 En-
ergy efficiency and reduced use in this way can act as a “force multiplier” 
—missions can go farther without refueling, running generators, or bringing 
fuel convoys to the battlefield.229 
Unlike players who may stand to lose from greater energy efficiency or 
reduced petroleum use, or who have questioned the existence of climate 
change, the DoD does not hedge in this regard.230 This role as a validator of 
climate science is not without its critics.231 To a large extent, this dispute 
reflects a difference as to which underlying values are more important—
energy independence and cost, or national security and the DoD’s mission. 
For example, in May 2012, Oklahoma Republican Senator James Inhofe, 
ranking member of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works and a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pre-
sented a report of the Congressional Research Service on the Senate floor 
stating that from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, the federal government as a 
whole had spent approximately $68.4 billion on “climate change activi-
ties.”232 Conflating these expenditures of all federal agencies with those of 
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the DoD, Inhofe stated, “In reality, it is President Obama’s war on afforda-
ble energy that is having a dramatic impact on our national security, a war 
that is further depleting an already stretched military budget and putting our 
troops at risk.” 233  Using the military budget to fund unproven climate 
change technologies, according to Senator Inhofe, is 
not only wrong . . . it is reckless. [The money that the] DoD has 
spent . . . on climate change and energy-efficient activities . . . 
could have been used to purchase 30 brandnew [sic] F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighters, 28 new F-22 Raptors, or completely pay for the 
C-130 Aviation Modernization Program that we have been work-
ing on for a long period of time.234 
Instead of focusing on the DoD’s own interpretation of its mission and na-
tional security, Inhofe has also argued that the government should support 
energy independence—for example, by approving the Keystone XL pipe-
line to bring Canadian tar sands oil to the United States, promoting domes-
tic hydraulic fracturing, and permitting federal agencies to purchase petro-
leum products that have a greater greenhouse gas footprint than crude oil.235 
To a certain extent, this exchange represents a conflict between supporters 
of the historic military-industrial complex and those of the new Military-
Environmental Complex. 
The critique of the DoD’s role as a validator of climate science and 
promoter of energy conservation is more widespread than a single senator. 
For example, one news media outlet has questioned the DoD’s priorities in 
the Military-Environmental Complex: 
We wonder if the environment is the uppermost thing on the 
minds of soldiers being shot at by the Taliban and avoiding being 
blown up by IEDs. . . . Certainly fuel and energy costs have risen 
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for the military as for the rest of us. But wouldn’t we be better 
served by tapping into the 200-year supply of oil under our feet 
and within our borders?236 
To a large extent, these critics miss the mark—at least according to the DoD 
itself—by focusing on the cost of fuel or energy independence for the Unit-
ed States, rather than the national security implications of transporting fuel 
to forward operating bases, the importance of reducing deaths by reducing 
the number of fuel convoys, or the importance of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to avoid increased geopolitical instability caused by climate 
change. These conflicts over values are deeply intertwined with the institu-
tions that interact within the Military-Environmental Complex. 
III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
A focus on governmental institutions should not obscure the significant 
role that the private sector plays in driving the Military-Environmental 
Complex. The Military-Environmental Complex is characterized by a deep 
level of interconnectedness between the military and the private sector. The 
military is leveraging private financing for major renewable energy infra-
structure projects on military lands to power its installations.237 In this inter-
connectedness is an important lesson: the potential of the Military-
Environmental Complex lies not only in the ability of the military to sup-
port the development of new technologies with potential spillover into the 
private sector, but also to draw lessons and experience from the private sec-
tor.238 
The money involved in these projects creates incentives for private 
firms to lobby both Congress and the DoD to adopt certain technologies and 
enter into lucrative contracts. The risk echoes that of the military-industrial 
complex – that there may be only slim connections between these technolo-
gies and contracts and the DoD’s mission. In some cases, these projects 
might harm the environment. For example, Congress has directed the DoD 
to study coal-to-liquid fuels as an alternative energy source on the battle-
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field.239 In other cases, however, the environment stands to benefit from this 
new focus on renewable energy and demand reduction. If the traditional 
“merchants of death” —firms that have made billions manufacturing weap-
ons systems—can become “merchants of microgrids,” not only does the 
environment potentially benefit, but the firms themselves may be trans-
formed in ways that benefit the environment. 
In the Military-Environmental Complex, the private sector plays sev-
eral key roles. First, banks and private developers pay significant upfront 
costs for major energy infrastructure projects on military lands to power its 
installations. Second, the DoD, at times in cooperation with other agencies, 
provides funding to private sector firms to finance the development of new 
technologies in test bed initiatives that may ultimately have civilian spin-off 
potential. Third, the private sector educates the DoD about lessons that pri-
vate firms have already learned in the area of energy conservation. Finally, 
the DoD may be able to educate the private sector about its demand reduc-
tion strategies and new technologies as well. This Part explores how these 
various relationships create a multi-dimensional conversation between gov-
ernment and the private sector that has the potential to affect and transform 
all parties. 
A. The Commercialization Valley of Death: Private Demand for 
Government Financing 
Part of the reason why government financing for new technology is so 
important lies in the so-called “Commercialization Valley of Death.” 240 
With nearly all renewable energy technologies currently more expensive per 
kilowatt-hour than conventional petroleum and fossil-fuel based energy,241 
demand and private investment in renewable energy generation is limited 
due to the longer time horizon that is required to recoup capital investments. 
In particular, experts in new energy finance have identified two locations of 
insufficient capital.242 The first is “early in a technology’s development, just 
as it is ready to exit the lab” —immediately after the so-called “Technology 
Creation stage” in which universities or national laboratories fund technol-
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ogy development, but before venture capital becomes available.243 The sec-
ond valley occurs after venture-capital financing but before the technology 
becomes commercially available and before the technology is proven on a 
widespread-enough scale that banks will be willing to lend capital for large 
projects.244 As a recent Bloomberg New Energy Finance report explained: 
Venture capital firms have high technology risk tolerance but rela-
tively limited capital, and they demand short-to-medium returns. 
Project finance funders and bank lenders typically have high levels 
of capital and can commit to longer-term investments, but they 
have little or no technology risk tolerance. No existing class of fi-
nancing institutions is effectively positioned to address this particu-
lar risk/return category.245 
Thus, some commentators contend that “only with the public sector’s help” 
can this Commercialization Valley of Death be surmounted.246 One organi-
zation, for example, has called for a variety of funding sources to overcome 
the Valley of Death, ranging from direct government funding and insurance 
products to public-private risk sharing and procurement solutions.247 
The Military-Environmental Complex lies at the crossroads of the pri-
vate sector’s need for government financing support and the government’s 
demand for new infrastructure, new technology, and existing technology on 
a large scale. It is no wonder that the private sector is trying to obtain DoD 
support for new technologies, given the need for non-venture capital and 
non-bank financing, and given the DoD’s track record in helping to support 
the development of new technologies. If such new energy technology and 
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sustainable methods are a social good, this demand for DoD support may be 
of great social benefit. 
Notably, the military’s more recent track record of adopting off-the-
shelf technologies, rather than creating military-specific new technologies, 
has been a key part of the Military-Environmental Complex. The DoD’s 
budget for fiscal year 2013 authorizes the DoD to expend more than $1.1 
billion on energy conservation and efficiency—primarily in existing build-
ings—but these efforts largely use existing commercial technology and 
methods rather than technological innovation.248 For instance, they often 
involve lighting retrofits, more efficient heating and cooling systems, and 
such low-hanging fruit as “double-pane windows, energy management con-
trol systems, and new roofs.”249 
B. Government Financing for New Technology Development 
The DoD recognizes its essential role in supporting the development 
and commercialization of renewable energy technology to serve DoD’s 
needs. DoD leadership understands that, “[a]bsent outside validation . . . 
these new technologies will not be widely deployed in time to meet our re-
quirements.”250 There are significant disincentives to be a first-user of new 
technology, as first-time users bear the largest costs on which others can 
free ride.251 Thus, the DoD can serve two important roles: as a first-user to 
evaluate the new “precommercial” technology, and as an early customer 
“thereby helping create a market, as it did with aircraft, electronics, and the 
internet.”252 
Congress has supported this interaction between the military and the 
private sector explicitly by providing funding sources and other vehicles for 
cooperation. For example, in 1990, Congress created the Strategic Envi-
ronmental Research and Development Program (“SERDP”).253 Among oth-
er purposes, the SERDP is designed to address environmental issues of con-
cern to the DoD and the DOE “through support for basic and applied re-
search and development of technologies that can enhance the capabilities of 
the departments to meet their environmental obligations”254 and to “identify 
technologies developed by the private sector that are useful” for the de-
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partments.255 Under the auspices of the SERDP, the DoD created the Envi-
ronmental Security Technology Certification Program (“ESTCP”) in 1995 
to address the Commercialization Valley of Death and “to promote the 
transfer of innovative technologies that have successfully established proof 
of concept to field or production use.”256 
In 2009, under the auspices of the ESTCP and SERDP, the DoD’s In-
stallation Energy Test Bed Initiative began annually awarding funding to 
installation (facility) energy management projects submitted by private 
firms, universities, national laboratories, and other organizations on a com-
petitive basis.257 Recent projects funded in 2013 include a battery energy 
storage system and microgrid control system, a data-center liquid-cooling 
system, high-concentration photovoltaics, a waste gasification system, tech-
nology that can reduce air-conditioner energy use through measuring opera-
tional energy efficiency, and a roof asset management system.258 Smart mi-
crogrids—which have the ability to reduce cost, increase use of renewables, 
and offer energy security—have been a particular emphasis of the Test Bed 
Initiative.259 
But DoD financing of new technology development is not the only 
face of the Military-Environmental Complex. Rather, the DoD is making a 
mark by leveraging private financing to adopt existing commercial technol-
ogies that reduce demand and generate renewable energy. 
C. Government Demand for Private Financing of Energy Infrastructure 
On the flip side of the private sector’s demand for government financ-
ing lies the DoD’s active quest for private financing as it seeks energy secu-
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rity for its facilities. Key statutory authority enables the DoD to leverage 
private financing by, for instance, entering into thirty-year PPAs for renew-
able energy, 260  enhanced-use leases, 261  and energy-savings performance 
contracts.262 Congressional authorization for these unique financing partner-
ships has been crucial. 
1. Thirty-Year Power Purchase Agreements 
Under 10 U.S.C. § 2922a, the DoD has unique statutory authority 
among federal agencies to enter into PPAs of up to thirty years “for the pro-
vision and operation of energy production facilities on real property under 
the Secretary’s jurisdiction or on private property and the purchase of ener-
gy produced from such facilities.”263 According to the House Report from 
1982, when Congress enacted the provision, “[t]he use of the authority of 
this section is not intended to enable a military department to compete with 
a public or private utility. It is intended to permit the exploration of a wide 
range of co-generation possibilities so that the conservation of scarce re-
sources may be maximized.” 264  Pursuant to other authority under Sec-
tion 2916, the military may sell to a utility company all of the electricity 
generated by the production facility produced on land under the DoD’s ju-
risdiction, and the proceeds of such sales may be used to purchase electrici-
ty and carry out military construction projects under the DoD’s energy per-
formance master plan.265 
In contrast, other federal agency PPAs for the purchase of utility ser-
vices are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 41,266 and 
the relevant statutory authority, 40 U.S.C. § 501.267 The GSA procures utili-
ty services on behalf of other agencies,268 but it is only permitted to enter 
into contracts with terms of ten years or less.269 This timeline has a pro-
found impact on the willingness of private firms to finance the development 
of renewable technology infrastructure, as renewables often do not return 
sufficient payback within the ten-year timeframe. 
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2. Enhanced-Use Leases 
The DoD can also lease property for large-scale renewable energy 
generation projects under its so-called “enhanced-use lease” authority.270 
Upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense that such a lease will 
“promote the national defense or . . . be in the public interest,” the DoD 
may lease certain real or personal property that is not needed for public use, 
receiving in return either cash or in-kind consideration at fair market val-
ue.271 These leases are often called “enhanced-use leases,” though they are 
not named as such by statute.272 The authorizing statute expressly contem-
plates that in-kind consideration may include the construction of new facili-
ties, the provision of facilities for use, or the provision or payment of utility 
services.273 Installations using enhanced-use lease authority can accept in-
kind consideration in the form of a discount on the DoD’s electric bill or in 
the form of infrastructure that will enhance energy security.274 Such leases 
may be for a term of five years, unless the Secretary determines that a long-
er lease “will promote the national defense or be in the public interest.”275 
Under such an enhanced-use lease, a private developer may enter into an 
agreement with the Secretary of Defense to lease DoD land to construct 
(among other things) a renewable energy generation facility, but the agree-
ment “shall be limited in term to the useful life of the energy production 
facility” because long-term leases of DoD land can be “detrimental to the 
long-term ability of the DoD to manage its property portfolio.”276 
3. Energy Savings Performance Contracts and Utility Energy Service 
Contracts 
In broad terms, an energy savings performance contract (“ESPC”) is a 
mechanism whereby a private entity “evaluates, designs, finances, acquires, 
installs and maintains energy saving equipment for a client, and receives 
compensation based on the performance of that equipment.”277 Under an 
ESPC, the energy service company (“ESCO”) “incurs the costs of project 
implementation, including audits, acquiring and installing equipment, and 
training personnel, in exchange for a predetermined price. Payment to the 
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ESCO is contingent upon realizing a guaranteed stream of future savings, 
with excess savings accruing to the Federal Government.”278 Congress has 
authorized federal agencies generally, and the military specifically, to enter 
into such contracts for periods of up to twenty-five years.279 In addition, as 
early as 1991, the President encouraged the military to enter into such 
shared energy savings contracts in Executive Order 12,759.280 
Alternatively, utility energy service contracts (“UESCs”) involve mixed 
public and private financing.281 An agency may enter into a UESC with a util-
ity, which agrees to pay certain capital costs upfront to implement selected 
energy conservation measures. 282  The agency can repay the utility from 
avoided cost savings accrued over the life of the project or from appropria-
tions.283 These payments may be made over time if utility or other private 
financing is part of the transaction.284 
The military has entered into several such UESCs and ESPCs. For ex-
ample, the Air Force entered into an ESPC at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, 
through which it now procures 100% of its energy through wind power.285 At 
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, using both ESPCs and UESCs, the Ma-
rines achieved a 44% reduction in energy use despite an increase in the foot-
print of its facility of 2 million square feet.286 Energy retrofits included de-
commissioning a steam plant, incorporating photovoltaic arrays, changing 
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fixtures, and using daylighting technology.287 At Hill Air Force Base in Utah, 
the military and the ESCO entered into an ESPC for an eighteen-year term to 
upgrade energy systems in 940 buildings.288 The ESCO is providing $2.5 mil-
lion in up-front costs; Utah Power & Light is providing $8 million in finan-
cial support; and the DoD will finance the remaining costs through its energy 
savings.289 Thus, Congress has provided the DoD with a number of key legal 
authorities that allow it to leverage private financing to incorporate energy-
savings measures at its installations. 
D. Taking Advantage of Private Financing: The Energy  
Initiatives Task Force 
The DoD is taking advantage of private financing in the Energy Initia-
tives Task Force (“EITF”) program.290 The Army created the EITF in Sep-
tember 2011, with the explicit goal of “collaborating with the private sector 
to invest in cost-effective, large scale (10 MW+) renewable energy pro-
jects” on Army installations.291 These projects, which include solar, wind, 
biomass, and geothermal projects, are designed to promote “energy security 
and sustainability.”292 Congress has mandated that the DoD produce or pro-
cure not less than 25% of its energy on installations from renewable sources 
by 2025,293 which the military has translated into one gigawatt each for the 
Army, Navy and Air Force.294 The EITF is the Army’s central management 
office for the execution of due diligence for potential projects, as well as for 
the initiation of permitting and other legal obligations like environmental 
impact assessments.295 On November 22, 2013, the EITF issued a Notice of 
Intent to Award letter to Ameresco, Inc., for the construction of an 18.6 
megawatt solar project at Fort Detrick in Maryland.296 In February, 2014, 
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the DoD issued a Notice of Intent to Award to ReEnergy Holdings for the 
purchase of up to 28 megawatts (MW) of electricity from a renewable ener-
gy biomass facility at Fort Drum in New York297; and the EITF has issued a 
Request for Proposals (RFP) for a biomass generation facility at Fort Irwin 
in California.298  
In addition, the EITF anticipates developing renewable projects at Fort 
Bliss, Texas, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, though both such projects 
will be in connection with existing utilities and subject to public utility 
commission approval, in part due to the regulatory environment in those 
states. 299  Although the Army neither finances nor owns the energy-
generating equipment, it will contract for the power through its authority to 
enter into PPAs and enhanced-use leases.300 The Army has established a 
contract vehicle that allows for up to $7 billion dollars to be spent on these 
types of contracts.301 
The EITF does not focus on developing new technology or surmount-
ing the Commercialization Valley of Death; it is about leveraging private 
financing for commercially proven, off-the-shelf technologies on a large 
scale. John Lushetsky, the former Executive Director of the EITF, explained 
why the EITF uses proven commercial technologies: “This conservatism is 
driven by the fact that there is one hundred percent private financing for 
EITF projects. We need this so Wall Street banks and those in the insurance 
industry can finance and underwrite the investment. We use very well un-
derstood, established technology with a track record.”302 
Lushetsky explained that the DoD’s unique authority to enter into thir-
ty-year PPAs is “critical for these projects”303: 
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Other agencies in the Government can buy electricity in a ten-
year contract under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. But you 
can’t do renewable energy project financing on a ten-year term. 
The capital costs are too high—you can’t amortize the costs over 
ten years and still have the electricity costs be acceptable. If you 
finance for thirty years but only contract for ten years, the devel-
oper bears the risk that the DoD may not renew the contract, dis-
couraging many developers.304  
Therefore, absent Congressional authority for these long-term PPAs, it is 
unlikely that the projects would succeed in attracting the necessary private 
financing.305 The DoD’s main advantage in the renewables market is not 
that it is the largest customer or the only customer for large-scale renewable 
projects, but that it is a “relatively concentrated customer.”306 
These privately financed projects are not limited to the Army. It was 
the Navy that undertook the first major project under the DoD’s statutory 
PPA authority at the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, authorizing the 
construction of a 13.8 megawatt photovoltaic array that began in January 
2012.307 This array will be the Navy’s largest, financed through a twenty-
year PPA.308 It will be designed, built, and operated by a private solar firm, 
with the facilities owned by a private financier.309 According to the DoD 
Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan: 
The role of the installation is to provide the land for the project 
and purchase electricity from it, at a rate that is locked in for 20 
years below the current retail utility rate. The 20-year term for the 
PPA—the first PPA of this duration with the federal govern-
ment—gives the Navy a significantly better rate than 10-year 
PPAs. The Navy incurs no upfront costs. The array is projected to 
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meet approximately 30 percent of the installation’s annual energy 
needs and reduce its energy costs by about $13 million over the 
20-year life of the contract.310 
The EITF program has screened all potential Army and National Guard in-
stallation sites for large-scale renewable projects nationwide.311 In addition, 
both specific military installations and private developers have proposed 
potential projects.312 
One of the challenges for the EITF program centers on how to measure 
success. As Lushetsky explained, there is an objective, easy-to-measure tar-
get set by Congress that DoD produce 25% of its energy through renewable 
sources by 2025.313 But a second question is equally important, if not as 
easily measured: how does one measure the impact of a particular project 
on energy security? “If we are providing energy security,” stated Lushetsky, 
“Then maybe the Army should be willing to pay more. The Army is current-
ly working to define the premium and under what conditions it would be 
justified.”314 This suggests that an effort to quantify the return to the mis-
sion from investment in renewable energy and demand reduction is a goal 
worth pursuing.315 
E. Dialogue with the Private Sector 
There is an ongoing dialogue between the DoD and the private sector in 
the Military-Environmental Complex. For example, Marc Kodack of the Of-
fice of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability de-
scribed an active back-and-forth between the DoD and private firms in the 
context of the Army’s Net Zero initiative.316 Net Zero is a program that aims 
to “direct Army installations to make every fiscally prudent effort to reduce 
their installation’s overall consumption of energy and water resources and 
disposal of solid waste in landfills to an effective rate of zero.”317 In early 
2011, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sus-
tainability canvassed all Army installations to ask if they wanted to be Net 
Zero pilot installations in energy, water, or waste.318 More than one hundred 
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installations applied, and the Army ultimately selected seventeen pilot instal-
lations.319  
The Net Zero initiative has brought together representatives of those pi-
lot installations with representatives from the private sector to discuss lessons 
learned in sustainable facilities. For instance, in June 2011, at Fort Dietrick, 
Maryland, the Net Zero program held its first conference for representatives 
from each pilot installation, inviting a speaker from Wal-Mart to discuss Wal-
Mart’s experience trying to reduce its water use through waterless urinals.320 
Kodack explained that the Wal-Mart participant emphasized “systems think-
ing, that you need to look at the facility as a whole. If you have a waterless 
urinal, that has an effect on your waste treatment system.”321 The Net Zero 
program thus learned valuable lessons from the private sector’s experience. In 
addition, in a second conference for the Net Zero pilot installations in January 
2012 in Chicago, a sustainability officer from the University of Chicago 
spoke about efforts to promote sustainability on campus.322 In the other direc-
tion, Katherine Hammack, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installa-
tions, Energy & Environment, has spoken to industry representatives about 
the Net Zero initiative and its lessons learned to date.323 Other senior defense 
officials have done the same to share lessons learned by the military. 
F. Echoes of the Past 
In some ways, the Military-Environmental Complex depends upon re-
lationships developed in the military-industrial complex. Recognizing this 
linkage is essential to understanding that some caution is necessary to avoid 
rent-seeking behavior. At the same time, the Military-Environmental Com-
plex may have the potential to transform some of these past relationships 
for the better. 
A review of the NDAAs—the annual DoD budgets—from fiscal years 
2008 to 2013 reveals many provisions promoting both the DoD’s national 
security mission and the goals of reducing demand and promoting renewa-
bles.324 But there are also provisions in the annual budget authorizations 
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suggesting that members of Congress have inserted requirements for the 
DoD that, although at first glance seem to promote reduced energy demand 
or the development of alternative renewable fuel sources, instead may actu-
ally simply benefit specific firms or geographic districts.325 
For example, Section 334 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct a study on “alternatives to reduce the life cycle emissions of alter-
native and synthetic fuels (including coal-to-liquid fuels).”326 Despite the 
unlikelihood that warfighters would want to transport coal to forward oper-
ating bases as a fuel source, this provision requires the DoD to study the 
“military utility of domestically-produced alternative and synthetic fuels for 
military operations and for use by expeditionary forces compared with the 
military utility and life cycle emissions of mobile, in-theater synthetic fuel 
processes.”327 Congress has likewise mandated that the 
Secretary of Defense shall develop a strategy to use fuel pro-
duced, in whole or in part, from coal, oil shale, and tar sands (re-
ferred to in this section as a “covered fuel”) that are extracted by 
either mining or in-situ methods and refined or otherwise pro-
cessed in the United States in order to assist in meeting the fuel 
requirements of the Department of Defense when the Secretary 
determines that it is in the national interest.328 
In 2008, the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Security 
issued a report entitled “More Fight—Less Fuel” that specifically recom-
mended against pursuing coal-to-liquid fuel strategies in light of highly un-
certain costs, high water consumption, high levels of wastewater, and lim-
                                                                                                                           
 325 By 2011, the Republicans in the House and both the Republicans and the Democrats in the 
Senate supported voluntary resolutions to ban earmarks. See Devin Dwyer & Matthew Jaffe, Sen-
ate Republicans Ban Earmarks; Will Democrats Follow?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://abc
news.go.com/Politics/earmark-moratorium-republicans-poised-ban-pork-barrel-spending/story?id
=12155964, archived at http://perma.cc/LVK-8TMV. But see Kate Brannen, Congressional Ear-
mark Ban Changes Business on Capitol Hill, DEF. NEWS (July 5, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.
defensenews.com/article/20120705/DEFREG02/307050003/Congressional-Earmark-Ban-Changes-
Business-Capitol-Hill, archived at http://perma.cc/FY6L-5DDE (arguing that the voluntary 2011 
earmark moratorium has not abolished the practice, but simply driven it into the shadows and 
made it more difficult to trace in the DoD’s budget). 
 326 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 § 334(a). In addi-
tion, 10 U.S.C. § 2918 prohibits the Defense Department from converting a coal-fired heating 
facility at a U.S. military installation in Europe to any other energy source facility “unless the 
Secretary determines that the conversion (1) is required by the government of the country in which 
the facility is located; or (2) is cost-effective over the life cycle of the facility.” 10 U.S.C. § 2918 
(2012). 
 327 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 § 334(b)(3). 
 328 10 U.S.C. § 2922d(a). 
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ited supplies of coal.329 The report suggested that money would be better 
spent on other technologies.330 
Protecting the domestic coal industry has not been the only thing on 
Congress’s mind. The timber industry has supporters as well. In the NDAA 
for Fiscal Year 2012, and then again in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, 
Congress prohibited the DoD from using appropriated funds to obtain 
LEED gold or platinum certification, unless waived by the Secretary of De-
fense based on a finding of no additional cost.331 Apparently, despite the 
military’s longstanding support for LEED certification to ensure that new 
facilities incorporate sustainable features,332 several members of Congress 
were concerned that LEED certification would have a negative impact on 
the U.S. timber industry, which was not privileged over foreign sources in 
LEED’s scoring system.333 These members of Congress thus sought to re-
move funding for the highest levels of LEED certification.334 
Another project that has received significant attention from the mili-
tary but which raises environmental risk tradeoffs is the use of polyurethane 
spray foam, which has been used to insulate tents in Iraq and Afghani-
stan.335 Although the spray foam reduces the need for air conditioning (and 
thus energy use and fuel convoys) by lowering the temperature inside tents 
at forward operating bases, the spray foam reduces indoor air quality such 
that additional ventilation measures are required, renders the tents “unre-
coverable” —meaning that they cannot be moved and reused after being 
treated with spray foam—and potentially creates waste materials that must 
be flown home to the United States for disposal.336 Another example of a 
                                                                                                                           
 329 DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 193, at 50–51. 
 330 Id. at 51. 
 331 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 § 2823; National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 2830. 
 332 See Paula Melton, Army to Congress: LEED Doesn’t Cost More, BUILDING GREEN (Feb. 
2, 2002, 7:02 PM), http://www2.buildinggreen.com/blogs/army-congress-leed-doesnt-cost-more, 
archived at http://perma.cc/562Q-SWLY. 
 333 See, e.g., Andy Medici, Industry Objects to Green-Gov Standards, FED. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012, 
6:00 AM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120107/FACILITIES02/201070302/Industry-objects-
green-gov-standards, archived at http://perma.cc/3WUY-VN8S; Jeffrey Spivak, LEED Backlash, UR-
BAN LAND (Feb. 22, 2012), http://urbanland.uli.org/Articles/2012/Feb/SpivakLEED, archived at http://
perma.cc/8X8-UQBK. 
 334 See, e.g., Medici, supra note 333; Spivak, supra note 333. 
 335 See Peck, supra note 195 (quoting Sharon Burke’s observation that although the insulation 
cut the tents’ energy consumption by 50% “[i]t’s not necessarily optimal, because then the tent is 
not mobile any more—and you have to dispose of it. However, for tents you had in place, it was a 
good solution. We took [fuel] trucks off the road with that.”). 
 336 HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE CIVIL ENG’R SUPPORT AGENCY, DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, 
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL LETTER (ETL) 10-6 (CHANGE 2): EXTERNAL FOAM INSULATION OF 
TEMPORARY STRUCTURES 6 (2010) (adding that besides rendering a structure “unrecoverable,” 
foam insulation “reduces indoor air quality (IAQ) below minimum standards unless modifications 
are made to provide fresh-air ventilation,” and that additional costs must be incurred for disposal). 
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project with unclear benefits to the DoD’s mission is the requirement to 
study small modular nuclear reactors as a source of alternative energy for 
military installations and forward operating bases.337 Despite the potential 
these reactors may hold for civilian energy generation uses, they could raise 
both safety and feasibility concerns if they were to be shipped to forward 
operating bases.338 
In addition, some of the players in the Military-Environmental Complex 
were—or are—players in the military-industrial complex. For example, sev-
eral of the firms receiving funding for ESTCP Installation Energy and Water 
Technology Demonstrations in 2012 and 2013 are among the top one hundred 
military contractors by dollar value of contracts awarded.339 These firms in-
clude the Boeing Corporation (second by dollar value of contracts),340 which 
received funding for “optimized decision support technology”;341 Raytheon 
Integrated Defense Systems (third by dollar value of contracts),342 which re-
ceived funding for a “Zinc Bromide Flow Battery Installation for Islanding 
and Backup Power”;343 and United Technologies Research Center (sixth by 
dollar value of contracts),344 which received funding for “energy performance 
analysis methodology.”345 These firms also include Honeywell International, 
                                                                                                                           
Notably, the only approved types of spray-foam insulation are offered by two firms—a corpora-
tion in Baghdad, Iraq, and Honeywell International, which in 2012 was the military contractor 
with the twenty-eighth largest volume of contracts by dollar figure, topping $2.4 billion. See id. at 
6–8; Federal Procurement Report, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/
index.php/reports, archived at http://perma.cc/TL99-L7KP (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
 337 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 2845, 
123 Stat. 2190, 2683 (2009). 
 338 See id.; cf. RICHARD B. ANDRES & HANNA L. BREETZ, NAT’L DEF. UNIV., SMALL NUCLE-
AR REACTORS FOR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: CAPABILITIES, COSTS, AND TECHNOLOGICAL IM-
PLICATIONS 5–7 (2011), available at www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf (describing 
the potential of small modular nuclear reactors). 
 339 See Department of Defense Announces New Installation Energy Technology Demonstrations 
for FY 2012, SERDP (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.serdp.org/News-and-Events/News-Announcements/
Program-News/Department-of-Defense-announces-new-installation-energy-technology-demonstra 
tions-for-FY-2012, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZFX-MWW2 [hereinafter FY 2012 Demonstra-
tions]; FY 2013 Demonstrations, supra note 257; Top 100 Contractors Report, U.S. GEN. SERVS. 
ADMIN., https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/reports/62-top-100-contractors-report, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6V4C-T7EE (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Top 100 Contrac-
tors] (listing top 100 DoD contractors by dollar figure in 2012). 
 340 Top 100 Contractors, supra note 339. Boeing receives over $29 billion in annual contracts 
with the DoD. See id. 
 341 FY 2013 Demonstrations, supra note 257. 
 342 Top 100 Contractors, supra note 339. Raytheon receives over $15 billion in annual con-
tracts with the DoD. See id. 
 343 FY 2012 Demonstrations, supra note 339. 
 344 Top 100 Contractors, supra note 339. United Technologies receives over $8 billion in 
annual contracts with the DoD. See id. 
 345 FY 2012 Demonstrations, supra note 339. In addition, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne re-
ceived fiscal year 2013 funding for “high concentration photovoltaics (HCPV) with a total electri-
cal generation capacity of 200kW.” FY 2013 Demonstrations, supra note 257. Pratt & Whitney 
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Inc. (twenty-eighth by dollar value of contracts),346 which received funding 
for numerous projects, including (1) a “Central Plant Optimization for Waste 
Energy Reduction (CPOWER) . . . [,] a model-based tool that can transform 
the management of control plants by automating and optimizing the operation 
of all central plant equipment to minimize energy consumption and cost”;347 
(2) “Open Automated Demand Response communications and control tech-
nology”;348 and (3) a building information model designed to identify “chron-
ic and recurring operating efficiencies.”349 In addition, microgrid demonstra-
tions at Fort Bliss, Texas (awarded to Lockheed Martin, first by dollar value 
of contracts) 350 and at Twentynine Palms, California (awarded to General 
Electric, twenty-fourth by dollar value of contracts,351 for an advanced mi-
crogrid system) are also relying on established contractors from the military-
industrial complex.352 
The story that one can weave from these facts depends largely on one’s 
view of the DoD’s mission. Some of the projects may appear to be simply 
“pork” projects, placed into the DoD budget at the behest of particular 
members of Congress on behalf of their district or a particular firm. For ex-
ample, the requirement to study coal-to-liquid fuels or the LEED prohibi-
tion arguably fall into this category. Other projects may be less black-and-
white. If one believes that the DoD should exclusively pursue its primary 
mission to protect national security, requirements to support or study tech-
nologies such as small modular nuclear reactors may be problematic. These 
reactors may not necessarily directly support the mission, and they could 
raise safety and feasibility concerns if they were brought to forward operat-
ing bases. If, on the other hand, agencies have an obligation to consider the 
larger public interest, including reducing the overall severity of climate 
change, then perhaps the support for small modular nuclear reactors is less 
                                                                                                                           
Rocketdyne was a subsidiary of United Technologies until its sale to GenCorp in July 2012, be-
coming part of Aerojet Rocketdyne. See GenCorp Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40888/000119312513144561/d49703
9d10q.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/E82M-DBVF; W.J. Hennigan, Rocketdyne Sold to Gen-
Corp for $550 Million, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/24/busi
ness/la-fi-rocketdyne-sale-20120724, archived at http://perma.cc/V6Y8-4JQW. Rocketdyne is “the 
largest liquid rocket propulsion designer, developer, and manufacturer in the U.S.” GenCorp Inc., 
Quarterly Report, supra. 
 346 Top 100 Contractors, supra note 339. Honeywell International, Inc. receives over $2.4 
billion in annual contracts with the DoD. See id. 
 347 FY 2013 Demonstrations, supra note 257. 
 348 FY 2012 Demonstrations, supra note 339. 
 349 Id. Honeywell Defense and Space also received funding for a “full-scale microgrid sys-
tem.” FY 2013 Demonstrations, supra note 257. 
 350 Top 100 Contractors, supra note 339. Lockheed Martin receives over $36 billion in annual 
contracts with the DoD. See id. 
 351 Id. General Electric receives over $2.6 billion in annual contracts with the DoD. See id. 
 352 See AEMR FY 2011, supra note 52, at 49–50. 
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problematic, especially if one considers that they may have a lower impact 
on climate change than conventional sources of fuel.353 
Similarly, the fact that established firms from the military-industrial 
complex are now building microgrids and other technologies in the Mili-
tary-Environmental Complex can be interpreted in several ways. On the one 
hand, this might suggest more continuity than innovation. A pessimistic in-
terpretation is that these major players are potentially lobbying for and win-
ning lucrative military contracts under a new name of sustainability, requir-
ing some caution to ensure that these contracts are really in the public inter-
est and not merely in the pecuniary interest of the firms. More optimistical-
ly, the Military-Environmental Complex might have the potential to influ-
ence some of these industrial giants to turn more “green.” If their profit mo-
tive dovetails with the military’s desire to reduce energy consumption and 
promote renewables, this alignment may have the potential to transform the 
military-industrial complex, at least in part. Ultimately, the most important 
spillover from the Military-Environmental Complex’s mission toward 
greater sustainability may not only be new technologies and new metrics, 
but also the values that drive large private firms and government contractors 
to seek new contracts. 
IV. SOME MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS 
The military is currently one of the most important domestic players in 
the development and adoption of new and existing technologies to reduce 
energy use and promote renewables. It is crucial to get this story right be-
cause it allows policymakers to recognize that there are potentially substantial 
benefits for the environment to the large-scale investments made in sustaina-
ble practices and technologies by the U.S. military. To the extent that congres-
sional or presidential mandates or procedural mechanisms support the DoD’s 
drive to sustainable energy use, such legal rules should be encouraged. But a 
deeper understanding of the DoD’s own incentives must underlie any legisla-
tion or presidential action. The DoD is focused first and foremost on its mis-
sion, not simply on an abstract desire to protect the environment or to pro-
mote energy independence. 
Recognizing the roots of the Military-Environmental Complex in the 
military-industrial complex identified by President Eisenhower (and by schol-
                                                                                                                           
 353 The same argument cannot easily be made for coal-to-liquid fuels, unless one believes 
solely in the value of energy independence absent any consideration of the military mission, the 
environment, or climate change. A fuller discussion of whether agencies should be obligated to 
consider the broader public interest, rather than solely their primary missions, is beyond the scope 
of this Article. See generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunc-
tions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (exploring various ways to 
address the problems of multiple-goal agencies). 
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ars writing in this vein both before and after his famous speech) is likewise 
essential for both policymakers and scholars. Problems of undue political in-
fluence have the potential to arise again in the environmental context dis-
cussed here. Instead of focusing on energy security, military contractors and 
members of Congress may seek contracts and partnerships that either do not 
support the military’s mission, or harm the environment by exacerbating the 
problems of climate change in the name of energy independence or cost re-
duction. Some caution is warranted to guard against this potential for harm. 
But the Military-Environmental Complex also reveals a more positive 
dimension to the interconnectedness between the public and private sectors. 
Firms participating in the Military-Environmental Complex provide financ-
ing to reduce reliance on fossil fuels by the single largest consumer of ener-
gy in the United States.354 In addition, and perhaps more importantly, these 
firms are forced to reconsider the war motive as the sole driver of military 
contracts, replacing it (or at least supplementing it) with a sustainability 
motive. Profitable military contracts now come not only from war, but also 
from technologies that reduce energy demand and promote alternative fuels. 
If the traditional “merchants of death” can become “merchants of mi-
crogrids,” not only does the environment potentially benefit, but the firms 
themselves may be transformed. It is possible, and worthy of further empir-
ical study, that both spin-ons and spin-offs of best practices and technologi-
cal innovation will occur as a part of the Military-Environmental Complex. 
To the extent that there may also be a spillover in the values and beliefs 
driving the Military-Environmental Complex—in particular, the recognition 
that climate change has negative consequences for national security—the 
environment wins. At a minimum, the dramatic scale at which the Military-
Environmental Complex can address environmental problems such as cli-
mate change and sustainability will demand greater attention from scholars 
and policymakers going forward, to ensure both that the private sector and 
the DoD learn from each other’s example, and that undue influence does not 
threaten to corrupt the value for the environment of this enterprise. 
An additional and perhaps equally important conclusion is that the Mili-
tary-Environmental Complex should play a crucial role in the debate over 
regulatory instruments in the legal and policy literature on climate change. 
Scholars and policymakers have advocated various regulatory options to ad-
dress climate change, including market approaches like carbon taxes or cap-
and-trade systems, imposition of technology standards, information disclo-
sure, and carbon footprint labeling. 355 Others have focused on climate fi-
                                                                                                                           
 354 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing the energy uses of the DoD and of 
the federal agency regime as a whole). 
 355 See supra notes 15–18 (citing sources on this point). 
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nance, favoring government subsidies for green technology development,356 
the creation of a governmental “green bank” to support emerging green tech-
nologies, 357 or government-funded technology inducement prizes. 358 Some 
expressly prefer a pluralist, multi-faceted, decentralized approach in light of 
the practical reality that a single, global regulatory program to combat climate 
change is unlikely to materialize.359 
The example of the Military-Environmental Complex is also important 
because it demonstrates that despite the lack of explicit substantive laws 
directing the DoD to reduce its energy use in the operational energy sector, 
the DoD is nonetheless undertaking serious efforts to reduce that energy use 
and explore alternative energy sources because its internal incentives have 
forced it to do so. An assumption that the military is indifferent to the envi-
ronment may obscure the essential role that internal incentives, rather than 
outside mandates, play. The military’s story is similar to that of Wal-Mart’s 
efforts to green its supply chain by, for example, reducing packaging.360 
Wal-Mart did not undertake this effort in response to a legal mandate.361 
Rather, it acted because internal incentives to reduce shipping costs aligned 
with environmental goals.362 
This is not to say that the Military-Environmental Complex therefore 
represents support for self-regulation by private firms in the environmental 
arena. To the contrary, even in the absence of direct substantive regulations, 
both Congress and the President have required the military to reduce facili-
ties energy use and encouraged the military to address operational energy 
use through such procedural measures as requiring reporting of greenhouse 
gas emissions and creating OEPP to centralize focus on the subject. 363 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that all private firms currently face—with a 
sense of life-or-death urgency—the same internal drivers toward sustaina-
bility that the DoD faces on the battlefield in light of attacks on fuel con-
voys. What the Military-Environmental Complex demonstrates instead is 
that a combination of approaches—directive, informational, behavioral, and 
                                                                                                                           
 356 See Clements & Sims, supra note 17, at 398. 
 357 See id. at 399–400. 
 358 See Adler, supra note 17, at 1. 
 359 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 360 See Packaging, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/environment-
sustainability/packaging, archived at http://perma.cc/8YUZ-VVNX (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
 361 See CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT, at xxvii–xxx (2011). 
 362  See id.; see also Environmental Sustainability, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/
global-responsibility/environment-sustainability, archived at http://perma.cc/TR82-L587 (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2014) (noting Walmart’s “three aspirational sustainability goals”: (1) “[t]o be supplied 100% 
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 363 See supra notes 138–286 and accompanying text. 
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self-initiated—will likely provide the best opportunity to address climate 
change on a global level. 
To ensure that the Military-Environmental Complex serves positive 
ends, rather than negative ones, this final Part offers several modest pro-
posals for Congress, the President, the DoD, and the private sector to take in 
this regard. Before addressing the concrete proposals, it is worthwhile to 
address the underlying question of what are the “positive ends” that the Mil-
itary-Environmental Complex should serve. 
A. Serving Positive Ends 
In the political science literature, particularly in the area of public 
choice theory, some scholars argue that interest groups competing within 
the legislative sphere tend to demand legislation that provides concentrated 
benefits while spreading out costs, and that legislators seek to supply legis-
lation that will ensure their reelection.364 Accordingly, one study of Con-
gress’s role in authorizing defense spending suggests a dichotomy between 
two competing visions of “effective” policy.365 The first vision is based on 
furthering “national defense,” holding that military expenditures are “dis-
tributed effectively if they go to places that are best able to transform mili-
tary procurement dollars into the goods and services deemed necessary to 
provide for the national defense.”366 In contrast, the “congressional distribu-
tive politics perspective” holds that military expenditures are distributed 
effectively if they benefit constituents “who will in turn vote for the incum-
bent” or a member of the incumbent’s party—that is, if they support the 
representative’s ultimate goal of being reelected.367 
In the Military-Environmental Complex, perhaps there is a third axis 
along which to measure effectiveness: whether a particular action, project, 
or policy benefits the environment. One can ask whether the action, project, 
or policy is providing the maximum possible benefit to the environment—
for example, by increasing sustainable energy use or minimizing impacts on 
the climate—as compared to alternatives.368 To take the analogy from the 
military spending context into the context of military actions more broadly, 
this Article takes the position that “effective” policies, whether financed 
through taxpayer dollars or private funds, are those that support the mili-
tary’s overall mission to protect national security, with the secondary goal 
                                                                                                                           
 364 See supra note 29 (citing sources on this point).  
 365 See BARRY S. RUNDQUIST & THOMAS M. CARSEY, CONGRESS AND DEFENSE SPENDING: 
THE DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT 17–18 (2002). 
 366 Id. at 18. 
 367 Id. 
 368 This approach raises questions regarding risk-risk tradeoffs that are outside the scope of 
this paper. 
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of increasing sustainable energy use and reducing the threat of climate 
change. Effective policies are those adopted because of national security 
implications or for environmental reasons, but they do not include policies 
that merely support the reelection of particular members of Congress. 
Therefore, in making the proposals below, the ultimate goal is to encourage 
those actions that support the military’s mission to reduce energy demand, 
increase the use of renewables, increase private financing opportunities, and 
reduce the possibility that parochial interests of particular private firms or 
members of Congress will lead the DoD astray from these important goals. 
The key question is how not only to promote policies that can protect 
national security and the environment, but also to improve and strengthen 
institutional structures that can avoid the pitfalls of interest group politics and 
rent-seeking by private firms that have plagued the military-industrial com-
plex. The next Section offers four modest proposals in this regard and sug-
gests that further empirical research is warranted. 
B. Four Modest Proposals and a Research Agenda 
First, Congress and the President should take steps to encourage both 
further efforts by the DoD to reduce energy demand and investment by pri-
vate firms in the generation of renewable energy that benefits the military. 
Such steps would include expanding the financial incentives that encourage 
the military to reduce demand and invest in renewables. They would also 
include expanding the federal requirement that the DoD obtain 25% of its 
energy from renewable energy sources by 2025 to ensure that all players, 
both within the DoD and in the private sector, understand that these invest-
ments in renewables are long-term investments. 369  Although the above 
analysis demonstrates that the DoD’s military goals have been the key un-
derlying driver of the push to reduce energy demand and increase the de-
velopment of alternative fuels, the legal rules have undoubtedly shaped the 
DoD’s actions and priorities in the Military-Environmental Complex. They 
have also ensured a greater degree of continuity across administrations in 
ways that can encourage more stability in private investment. To the extent 
that Congress can incorporate into legislation additional incentives for pri-
                                                                                                                           
 369 Long-term instruments are necessary not only to provide the right incentives to private 
financiers to invest in the upfront capital costs in order to recover long-term gains, but also be-
cause individuals tend to be “myopic” about the risks of climate change, focusing more readily on 
the short term. Cf. Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Market and Government 
Failure in Insuring and Mitigating Natural Catastrophes: How Long-Term Contracts Can Help, in 
PUBLIC INSURANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS 115, 117 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2010) (advocating a 
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pia” regarding natural disasters and encourage individuals to invest in appropriate mitigation 
measures). 
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vate firms to continue to finance these major renewables generation pro-
jects, either through the tax code or other programs, taxpayers could save 
dollars in the long run. 
A second substantive recommendation would extend success stories 
from the Military-Environmental Complex into other contexts. Specifically, 
Congress should extend to agencies other than the DoD—most importantly, 
the GSA, which purchases energy on behalf of other agencies—the ability 
to use thirty-year PPAs as under 10 U.S.C. § 2922a. 370 Congress should 
make universally available to agencies this provision that, according to the 
Director of the EITF, has been essential in attracting private capital to fi-
nance the development and construction of large-scale renewable energy 
facilities that benefit both the military and the private sector.371 Other agen-
cies should be permitted to share in this potential for public-private partner-
ships. 
Third, successful dissemination of information about technological in-
novation beyond government agencies requires openness rather than secre-
cy.372 Thus, to the extent that the military is driving innovation, it should 
promote the diffusion of technologies that can reduce conventional energy 
demand and develop renewables into the civilian world, rather than holding 
such technology close to the vest in the name of national security. Given the 
military’s role as a validator of climate science and its recognition that cli-
mate change has the potential to increase violent conflict in the world, dif-
fusion is likely to be in the military’s interests in this context. 
Relatedly, the DoD and the private sector should voluntarily create more 
mechanisms for interaction to share best practices, experiences with new 
technology, and behavioral approaches. 373  Again, an understanding of the 
military-industrial complex is helpful here. In 1916, Congress created a 
Council of National Defense (“CND”), staffed by six members of the cabinet, 
to advise the President on the critical issue of industrial mobilization.374 So-
called “dollar-a-year” men—executives from the private sector who earned 
only a dollar each year for their service on the National Defense Advisory 
Commission (“NDAC”) while retaining their positions and salaries in private 
firms—aided the CND in advising the President on this issue.375 Upon a dec-
                                                                                                                           
 370 10 U.S.C. § 2922a (2012); see supra notes 263–269 and accompanying text. 
 371 See Telephone Interview with John Lushetsky, supra note 295. 
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 375 See id. 
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laration of war, it was the NDAC—staffed largely by these private execu-
tives—that “assumed responsibility for mobilizing the economy.”376 But in 
1917, the NDAC’s functions were assumed by the War Industries Board 
(“WIB”), a government agency that united members of industry and govern-
ment representatives to tackle jointly the complex questions of how industry 
could be mobilized quickly for the war.377 The WIB was “subordinate to the 
Council of National Defense” and “could only advise the president.”378 The 
WIB “[a]nalyzed the industrial requirements and capacities of the United 
States and the other Allies[; i]ssued clearances on government orders[; s]et 
priorities in commodity production and delivery[; a]rranged price-fixing 
agreements for raw materials; [e]ncouraged resource conservation and devel-
opment[; and s]upervised Allied purchasing in the United States.”379 
Criticisms abounded that these private executives had too much pow-
er.380 Likewise, the U.S. War Department was “unwilling and unable to co-
operate with WIB” out of concern that its authority was being superseded 
by civilian control and the War Department’s own disorganized procure-
ment systems.381 As a result of this lack of cooperation between industry 
and the military, “industrial plants in the Northeast were overloaded with 
contracts; prices skyrocketed; critical shortages of fuel, power, and raw ma-
terials developed; and the railway and shipping systems became hopelessly 
congested.”382 Mobilizing industry for war in a time when the military re-
quired private industrial aid to produce armaments and other needed sup-
plies may be an imperfect analogy to the drive to develop clean energy 
technology and processes to reduce demand because the sense of urgency 
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may be different. Yet the need to ensure cooperation between the military 
and the private sector is paramount, especially in light of the apparent suc-
cess stories of programs in which the military relies on private financing 
and existing commercial technology. 
Although the creation of a formal advisory committee staffed by mem-
bers of both the private sector and the military seems ill-advised in light of 
past experience with the WIB, it is nonetheless worthwhile to encourage 
regular communication between business and the DoD to promote sharing 
of best practices in the clean energy arena. Universities could play an im-
portant role in this arena, and they should recognize that this area may 
prove fruitful for innovation. As centers of innovation both in technology 
and ideas, universities—and, more specifically, business schools, with their 
focus on promoting innovation in the private sector as well as investment 
and finance—could bring leaders from business and the DoD together on a 
regular basis. Such conferences can ensure that representatives of both the 
private sector and the military share best practices, brief one another on the 
newest technological innovations and behavioral success stories, and share 
information regarding potential opportunities for private firms to invest in 
innovation. Of course, the military and private sector can do this on their 
own initiative as well. 
Fourth, it is essential to be aware of the potential for the Military-
Environmental Complex to lead to rent-seeking. Any time government 
funds are available, fraud, waste, and abuse are always a risk. Existing laws 
regulating lobbying and disclosure of contacts between the private sector 
and both Congress and the Executive branch, including the Lobbying Dis-
closure Act of 1995,383 as amended by the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007,384 go a long way to ensuring that contacts be-
tween industry and government are transparent. In addition, the qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act protect whistleblowers who report on 
fraud in government contracting.385  
Because the Military-Environmental Complex is new and developing, 
more empirical research is warranted as to whether and in what circumstances 
there may be undue influence as opposed to normal political lobbying activi-
ty, and whether any more must be done to prevent rent-seeking and fraud. 
Such research might include, for example, determining which interest groups 
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contact members of Congress and the military to seek support for particular 
projects, which geographic areas of the country stand to benefit, whether 
those projects are in the interest of national security and reducing climate 
change-related risks, whether the projects promote values other than the DoD’s 
core mission, and the impact such contacts have as to whether particular pro-
jects are funded. Thus, this Article proposes a research agenda to understand 
precisely the impact military R&D funding and procurement have on the de-
velopment and diffusion of new technologies in the clean energy sector. This 
research must also assess, based on past experience from the military-
industrial complex, whether military domination of technical specifications 
leads to technologies that are ill-adapted to commercial needs. 
The Military-Environmental Complex has already gone a long way to 
encouraging a dialogue between government and the private sector, and 
among government institutions, about the goals of sustainability. Properly 
regulated, the Military-Environmental Complex may secure its place within 
the regulatory toolkit as a way to foster energy sustainability in the long term. 
CONCLUSION 
Properly understood, the military’s roles as a war fighter, a landlord, a 
first-user of precommercial technologies, and a potential high-demand con-
sumer provide it with the opportunity to lead the way in sustainable energy 
use and development of technologies. The DoD has already taken important 
steps to reduce energy use, especially through partnering with the private 
sector. With reference to the lessons of the military-industrial complex—
and with controls to limit fraud, abuse, and rent-seeking behavior—these 
efforts should be expanded in the new Military-Environmental Complex. 
